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ISABEL ALLENDE

VOL. 48

11

FOOTNOTE TO THE COLD WAR: THE HARVARD RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER

MARTIN OPPENHEIMER

NUCLEAR CLOUDS OVER THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND JAPAN

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Two articles in this issue recall how in the early post-war years the universities became cold war battlefields. The purge of dissenting academics led to the dismissal of hundreds of scholars whose loss diminished serious inquiry in their respective fields for decades. This hysteria was in large measure provoked by the reaction of the ruling class to the changed post-Second World War landscape: the emergence of the Soviet Union as a super power, the rise of revolutionary China, the fear of leftist insurgency in Western Europe, the appearance of anti-colonial movements in the Southern Hemisphere, as well as apprehension over domestic trade union militancy, radicalism, and the birth of the civil rights movement. There was also the fear, in American industrial and financial circles, of a return to pre-war depression. Even as the United States demobilized and its industries geared up to fulfil

(Continued on inside back cover)

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BREATH OF HOPE: On the Writings of Eduardo Galeano

By ISABEL ALLENDE

Many years ago, when I was young and still believed that the world could be shaped according to our best intentions and hopes, someone gave me a book with a yellow cover that I devoured in two days with such emotion that I had to read it again a couple more times to absorb all its meaning: *The Open Veins of Latin America*, by Eduardo Galeano.

In the early seventies Chile was a small island in the tempestuous sea in which history had plunged Latin America, the continent that appears on the map in the form of an ailing heart. We were in the midst of the Socialist government of Salvador Allende, the first Marxist ever to become president in a democratic election, a man who had a dream of equality and liberty, and the passion to make that dream come true. That book with the yellow covers, however, proved that there were no safe islands in our region, we all shared five hundred years of exploitation and colonization, we were all linked by a common fate, we all belonged to the same race of the oppressed. If I had been able to read between the lines, I could have concluded that Salvador Allende's government was

Isabel Allende is the author of several bestselling novels including *In the House of the Spirits*, *The Infinite Plan*, and *Paula*. Eduardo Galeano's classic *Open Veins of Latin America*, much honored since its publication 25 years ago, is further honored by Isabel Allende's new preface, printed here with the author's permission.

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doomed from the beginning. It was the time of the Cold war, and the United States would not allow a leftist experiment to succeed in what Henry Kissinger called "its backyard." The Cuban revolution was enough; no other socialist project would be tolerated, even if it was the result of a democratic election. On September 11, 1973, a Military Coup ended a century of democratic tradition in Chile and started the long reign of General Augusto Pinochet. Similar coups followed in other countries, and soon half the continent's population was living in terror. This was a strategy designed in Washington and imposed upon the Latin American people by the economic and political forces of the right. In every instance the military acted as mercenaries to the privileged groups in power. Repression was organized on a large scale; torture, concentration camps, censorship, imprisonment without trial, and summary executions became common practices. Thousands of people "disappeared," masses of exiles and refugees left their countries running for their lives. New wounds were added to the old and recent scars that the continent had endured. In this political context *The Open Veins of Latin America* was published. This book made Eduardo Galeano famous overnight, although he was already a well known political journalist in Uruguay.

Like all his countrymen, Eduardo wanted to be a soccer player. He also wanted to be a saint, but as it turned out, he ended up committing most of the deadly sins, as he once confessed. "I have never killed anybody, it is true, but it is because I lacked the courage or the time, not because I lacked the desire." He worked for a weekly political magazine *Marcha*, and at twenty-eight he became the director of the important newspaper *Epoca*, in Uruguay. He wrote *The Open Veins of Latin America* in three months, in the last ninety nights of 1970, while he worked during the day in the University, editing books, magazines, and newsletters.

Those were bad times in Uruguay. Planes and ships left filled with young people who were escaping from poverty and mediocrity in a country that forced them to be old at twenty, and that produced more violence than meat or wool. After an eclipse that had lasted a century, the military invaded the scene with the excuse of fighting

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the Tupamara guerrilla. They sacrificed the spaces of liberty and devoured the civil power, which was less and less civil.

By the middle of 1973 there was a military coup, he was imprisoned, and shortly afterward he went into exile in Argentina, where he created the magazine *Crisis*. But by 1976 there was a military coup also in Argentina, and the "dirty war" against intellectuals, leftists, journalists, and artists began. Galeano initiated another exile, this time in Spain, with Helena Villagra, his wife. In Spain he wrote *Days and Nights of Love and War*, a beautiful book about memory, and soon after he began a sort of conversation with the soul of America: *Memories of Fire*, a massive fresco of Latin American history since the pre-Colombian era to modern times. "I imagined that America was a woman and she was telling in my ear her secrets, the acts of love and violations that had created her." He worked on these three volumes for eight years, writing by hand. "I am not particularly interested in saving time: I prefer to enjoy it." Finally, in 1985, after a plebiscite defeated the military dictatorship in Uruguay, Galeano was able to return to his country. His exile had lasted eleven years, but he had not learned to be invisible or silent; as soon as he set foot in Montevideo he was again working to fortify the fragile democracy that replaced the military junta, and he continued to defy the authorities and risk his life to denounce the crimes of the dictatorship.

Eduardo Galeano has also published several works of fiction and poetry; he is the author of innumerable articles, interviews, and lectures; he has obtained many awards, honorary degrees, and recognition for his literary talent and his political activism. He is one of the most interesting authors ever to come out of Latin America, a region known for its great literary names. His work is a mixture of meticulous detail, political conviction, poetic flair, and good storytelling. He has walked up and down Latin America listening to the voices of the poor and the oppressed, as well as those of the leaders and the intellectuals. He has lived with Indians, peasants, guerrillas, soldiers, artists, and outlaws; he has talked to presidents, tyrants, martyrs, priests, heroes, bandits, desperate mothers, and patient prostitutes. He has been bitten by snakes, suffered

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tropical fevers, walked in the jungle, and survived a massive heart attack; he has been persecuted by repressive regimes as well as by fanatical terrorists. He has opposed military dictatorships and all forms of brutality and exploitation, taking unthinkable risks in defense of human rights. He has more first-hand knowledge of Latin America than anybody else I can think of, and uses it to tell the world of the dreams and disillusions, the hopes and the failures of its people. He is an adventurer with a talent for writing, a compassionate heart, and a soft sense of humor. "We live in a world that treats the dead better than the living. We, the living, are askers of questions and givers of answers, and we have other grave defects unpardonable by a system that believes death, like, money, improves people."

All these talents were already obvious in his first book, *The Open Veins of Latin America*, as was his genius for story-telling. I know Eduardo Galeano personally: he can produce an endless stream of stories with no apparent effort for an undetermined period of time. Once we were both stranded in a beach hotel in Cuba with no transportation and no air-conditioning. For several days he entertained me with his amazing stories over piña coladas. This almost superhuman talent for storytelling is what makes *The Open Veins of Latin America* so easy to read—like a pirate's novel, as he once described it—even for those who are not particularly knowledgeable about political or economic matters. The book flows with the grace of a tale; it is impossible to put it down. His arguments, his rage, and his passion would be overwhelming if they were not expressed with such superb style, with such masterful timing and suspense. Galeano denounces exploitation with uncompromising ferocity, yet this book is almost poetic in its description of solidarity and human capacity for survival in the midst of the worst kind of despoliation. There is a mysterious power in Galeano's story-telling. He uses his craft to invade the privacy of the reader's mind, to persuade him or her to read and to continue reading to the very end, to surrender to the charm of his writing and the power of his idealism.

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In his *Book of Embraces*, Eduardo has a story that I love. To me it is a splendid metaphor of writing in general and his writing in particular.

There was an old and solitary man who spent most of his time in bed. There were rumors that he had a treasure hidden in his house. One day some thieves broke in, they searched everywhere and found a chest in the cellar. They went off with it and when they opened it they found that it was filled with letters. They were the love letters the old man had received all over the course of his long life. The thieves were going to burn the letters, but they talked it over and finally decided to return them. One by one. One a week. Since then, every Monday at noon, the old man would be waiting for the postman to appear. As soon as he saw him, the old man would start running and the postman, who knew all about it, held the letter in his hand. And even St. Peter could hear the beating of that heart, crazed with joy at receiving a message from a woman.

Isn't this the playful substance of literature? An event transformed by poetic truth. Writers are like those thieves, they take something that is real, like the letters, and by a trick of magic they transform it into something totally fresh. In Galeano's tale the letters existed and they belonged to the old man in the first place, but they were kept unread in a dark cellar, they were dead. By the simple trick of mailing them back one by one, those good thieves gave new life to the letters and new illusions to the old man. To me this is admirable in Galeano's work: finding the hidden treasures, giving sparkle to worn out events, and invigorating the tired soul with his ferocious passion.

The Open Veins of Latin America is an invitation to explore beyond the appearance of things. Great literary works like this one wake up consciousness, bring people together, interpret, explain, denounce, keep record, and provoke changes. There is one other aspect of Eduardo Galeano that fascinates me. This man who has so much knowledge and who has—by studying the clues and the signs—developed a sense of foretelling, is an optimist. At the end of *Century of the Wind*, the third volume of *Memory of Fire*, after 600 pages proving the genocide, the cruelty, the abuse, and exploitation exerted upon the people of Latin America, after a patient recount of

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everything that has been stolen and continues to be stolen from the continent, he writes:

> The tree of life knows that, whatever happens, the warm music spinning around it will never stop. However much death may come, however much blood may flow, the music will dance men and women as long as the air breaths them and the land plows and loves them.

This breath of hope is what moves me the most in Galeano's work. Like thousands of refugees all over the continent, I also had to leave my country after the military coup of 1973. I could not take much with me: some clothes, family pictures, a small bag with dirt from my garden, and two books: an old edition of the *Odes* by Pablo Neruda, and the book with the yellow cover, *Las Venas Abiertas de America Latina.* More than twenty years later I still have that same book with me. That is why I could not miss the opportunity to write this introduction and thank Eduardo Galeano publicly for his stupendous love for freedom, and for his contribution to my awareness as a writer and as a citizen of Latin America. As he said once: "it's worthwhile to die for things without which it's not worthwhile to live."

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

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FOOTNOTE TO THE COLD WAR: THE HARVARD RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER

by MARTIN OPPENHEIMER

In 1993 a German sociologist Uta Gerhardt edited an anthology entitled *Talcott Parsons on National Socialism.*[1] The book opens with a 78-page biographical introduction by Gerhardt and also includes fourteen essays by Parsons, some never before published. They deal with a range of topics from academic freedom, propaganda, and anti-Semitism to concrete discussions of Nazism and German social structure, the nature of fascist movements. There is even a radio script from September, 1940 that is a thinly disguised argument for intervention in the war.

Talcott Parsons was a leading figure in twentieth century American sociology. Parsons, who studied at Heidelberg among other places before going on to a long career at Harvard, is best known for his "functional analysis" of social systems, an essentially status-quo oriented sociology. His principal works, *The Structure of Social Action* (1939) and *The Social System* (1951), continue to be major pieces of the mainstream sociological canon today.

Gerhardt tells us that her collection of Parsons' work extends to 1951 when he published *The Social System.* So why

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does her biographical essay stop in 1946? Clearly an admirer of Parsons and his anti-totalitarian views, she essentially ignores his political and intellectual activities in the post-war years. Parson's role in the founding of the Harvard Russian Research Center, the subject of this article, is not mentioned. Gerhardt offers no suggestion for this omission. But the story of Parson's post-war years is more than a scholarly footnote. It is a story with continuing resonance and relevance.

It begins with another prominent Harvard scholar; Clyde M. Kluckhohn, a cultural anthropologist. Kluckhohn wrote widely on the culture of Navaho Indians, most notably *Navaho Witchcraft* (1944), and was also the author of the best-selling *Mirror for Man* (1949). But in 1948, Kluckhohn was, curiously, director of the newly-organized Harvard Russian Research Center (HRRC). That summer he dispatched Parsons, then chairman of Harvard's soon-to-be famous Social Relations Department, to Germany to identify and interview Soviet emigres resident in West Germany who could provide information on the USSR. Another part of Parson's mission was to recruit the most important of these "sources" who would be brought to the United States and given jobs at Harvard or other American academic institutions. Some of the latter were accused by the Soviets as war criminals and/or Nazi collaborators. One, for example, had worked for the SS in Berlin and, following his arrival in the United States under an assumed name in 1949, was debriefed by the State Department; failing to get a job at Harvard, he went on to the University of Washington in Seattle.

The interview project, funded by the Air Force and directed by HRRC staff, took place in 1950-51 under the umbrella of a Harvard-funded subsidiary formally run by emigres called the Institute for Research on the History and Institutions of the USSR, or more popularly the Munich Institute. In fact, from 1951 to 1971 it was a thinly-disguised propaganda outfit funded by the CIA. Some of Parsons' other emigre contacts in 1948 were also involved with this Institute.[2]

Parsons was aware, at least in general terms, of the backgrounds of the emigres with whom he was directly or indirectly involved. He was a founding member of HRRC's

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Executive Committee and had met with U.S. and British intelligence in Germany. He knew that several of his potential recruits or contacts were "hot" (his term), and were wanted men. In one letter to Kluckhohn, he even expressed some doubt about this group, which included veterans of the Vlasov army (Soviet POWs mobilized to fight for the Nazis), characterizing their beliefs as "extreme." His own involvement with them seems to have stopped after that summer, although he did maintain a relationship with the intelligence community over the years. He was a consultant to the CIA on student protest, and on CIA recruitment, as late as 1974.[3]

The Harvard-Parsons project had its origins nearly a half-century earlier, when Andrew Carnegie set up a series of trusts for various philanthropic purposes. All would have major influence on a multiplicity of social institutions, particularly education, but none more than the Carnegie Corporation. Founded in 1911 its primary focus on education allowed it to play a major, if often indirect, role in helping to define and carry out aspects of U.S. foreign policy. It was one of the major sponsors and funders of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), perhaps the most important non-governmental organization influencing U.S. foreign policy, then and now. Both Carnegie and CFR had strong ties to Wall Street, and the U.S. foreign policy establishment (it mattered little if there was a Republican or a Democratic administration).[4] Carnegie's Board of Trustees included several people connected with the house of Morgan, several AT&T officers, and a vice president and general counsel at Chrysler, among others. Of seventeen members of the Board in 1947 and 1948, twelve came from leading corporate and financial institutions, and/or "white shoe" Wall Street law firms. General George C. Marshall, who was Secretary of State, was also a Trustee. Three Carnegie associates played major roles in the Council on Foreign Relations: Elihu Root, Sr., a Wall Street lawyer and former Secretary of State, was a founder of the Council after the First World War; Russell Leffingwell, a director and past chairman at J.P. Morgan and ex-Assistant Secretary of the Treasury was President and Chairman of the CFR Board after the Second World War; and Devereaux C. Josephs, also a J.P.

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Morgan director, became a CFR officer in 1951. Virtually all Carnegie's trustees and staff served the Council in one way or another. One trustee was also a member of Harvard's Board of Overseers.[4] Not incidentally, Allen W. Dulles, a member of a prominent Wall Street law firm and later Director of Central Intelligence, served as President of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1946 to 1950.

Another of Carnegie's trustees was Frederick H. Osborn, former President of the Detroit, Toledo, and Ironton Railroad Company, and a partner and director of several Wall Street banking firms before the war. Osborne was a leading proponent of the racist pseudo-science, eugenics. The eugenics movement provided the "scientific" justification for the racially restrictive 1924 immigration act which, in turn, influenced Hitler's infamous Nuremberg Laws, and the "Final Solution." Osborn was one of the founding directors of the Pioneer Fund, established in 1937 to promote "race betterment." This fund is responsible for much of the "research" that underpins books such as Richard Herrnstein's and Charles Murray's 1994 spurious study of the alleged intellectual inferiority of African-Americans, *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life.*[5]

During the Second World War, Osborn served as a General responsible for morale and propaganda, a strange assignment for a racist in the war against fascism. In 1946 he briefly became a "dollar-a-year-man," representing the United States at the newly-formed U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. In response to difficulties understanding the Soviet negotiating position, he sought the advice of a young psychologist and Carnegie staff member, John Gardner. Gardner, later president of the Carnegie Corporation and then Lyndon Johnson's Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, was, between and after government jobs, a director of New York Telephone, Shell Oil, and American Airlines among other companies.

In the early post-war years, Carnegie Corporation trustees, in line with dominant corporate, financial, and government policy interests, emphasized support for scholarship in emergent multi-disciplinary academic programs called "area studies." Gardner, drawing on his experience with Osborn,

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recognized that there was little information available on the Soviet Union and urged Carnegie to support a Soviet areas studies center. Gardner came back from a trip to Washington with encouragement that the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Group, successor to the army's wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and predecessor to the CIA, would welcome such a move.

In July, 1947, Talcott Parsons told Gardner he thought such a center should be located at Harvard. Gardner chose Harvard even though other universities had more expertise on the USSR. Neither Parsons, nor the director-designate, Kluckhohn, even spoke Russian. But Kluckhohn was ideal to lead the center. He had "top secret" clearance from the Defense Department and was already actively involved in Air Force intelligence projects. He also had done research on Japanese morale during the Second World War, providing, it was thought, some useful background for work on Russian morale, in which the Air Force was now interested. Parsons himself had been offered a job in 1945 by William L. Langer of the OSS. Parsons turned it down; Langer soon went to Harvard's History Department, and in 1954 succeeded Kluckhohn as Director of the HRRC. Langer shortly thereafter became an editor of *Foreign Affairs*. In September and October, 1947, Gardner completed his plan, proposing Kluckhohn (who was President of the American Anthropological Association that year) as HRRC chairman, he also created an executive committee that included Parsons and sociologist Alex Inkeles. Funding for the HRRC soon followed. The Carnegie Corporation granted $100 thousand for the first year of operation and another $640 thousand for the following five years; in all $875 thousand was disbursed between 1947 and 1957.

From the beginning there was close liaison with the State Department. In January, 1948, the CIA contacted Gardner and this connection was maintained. The Center was formally opened in February, 1948. By May, 1949, government requests for research help had reached "flood proportions," according to Kluckhohn. The Department of Defense's research and development arm, the Office of Naval Research,

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and Air Force Intelligence, and its Human Resources Research Institute were all soon involved with the center.

Between October, 1947, and February, 1948, Gardner held numerous conversations in order to identify candidates to staff the Center. He interviewed, among others, such leading academics as Louis Wirth and Robert Redfield to obtain advice. His views were then sent to Kluckhohn, who made the appointments. One of those Gardner interviewed was the historian H. Stuart Hughes, grandson of a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, then in the State Department. Hughes was appointed assistant director, but by mid-April, 1948, found himself in deep trouble for unconventional cold war attitudes, including his support for Henry Wallace's anti-Cold war presidential campaign. In short order, he was terminated, the decision coming directly from Devereaux Josephs at Carnegie.[7] It was Gardner who actually told Hughes he was out. Carnegie quietly picked up the tab in order to avoid scandal, shifting Hughes to a Harvard academic line. There is some evidence that this maneuver was undertaken to protect the HRRC's right flank from McCarthyism, on the principle, by then pretty much established at Harvard and elsewhere, that if they did their own internal purging, the worst excesses of McCarthyism (embarrassing hearings, public fuss, etc.), would be avoided.

By this time, all of the U.S. establishment, exemplified, but only in part, by the Carnegie Corporation and its corporate backers, the Council on Foreign Relations, Harvard, and the State Department—were solidly committed to cold war assumptions and policy. Churchill had made his Iron Curtain speech at Fulton, Missouri on March 5, 1946. The Truman doctrine, supporting "free peoples" resisting presumed subversive pressures from the Soviet Union, was advanced a year later. In June, 1947, the Soviets walked out of Marshall Plan meetings in Paris, believing them to be a fraud. George Kennan, a CFR member who had served in the U.S. Moscow embassy during the war, advanced his "containment" policy in an address to the Council in January, 1947, and as the pseudonyminous "X," published his thesis that July in *Foreign Affairs*.[8] By then he headed the State Department's Policy

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Planning Committee. The Carnegie Corporation, fully committed to funding efforts that would support a strong cold war posture for the United States, saw the HRRC as part of that strategy because of its specific focus on the affairs of the cold war enemy.

Once the HRRC was in place, who determined the research program, the tactical phase of Carnegie's broader cold war assumptions and strategy? It was not determined neutrally, based on intrinsic academic or scholarly interest, although scholars could of course derive academic profit from those aspects of research that were not classified (much was not). Nor was it determined directly by the Carnegie people or its corporate sponsors, although it was consistent with their interests (it had to be, given Carnegie's naming and vetting of Harvard personnel). The evidence is that the program, including what came to be known as the Harvard Refugee Interview Project, was determined by Washington, in the context of the government's cold war foreign policy strategy.

In January, 1948, even before the formal initiation of the HRRC, John Paton Davies, a member of George F. Kennan's Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, visited Harvard and met with Kluckhohn. In a March 4 paper classified as "secret," Davies outlined a covert plan to encourage defections from the U.S.S.R. and to use Soviet emigres living in Germany as intelligence sources. The plan was approved by Under Secretary of State (and Wall Streeter) Robert A. Lovett on March 15. From Lovett's desk the plan went via the National Security Agency for transmittal to the CIA. As a HRRC executive committee member, Talcott Parsons was aware of Davies' plans. Parsons' link with the State Department covert operation is clear from letters that Parsons wrote to Kluckhohn in the Summer of 1948.

The Davies project fit well with what Carnegie had in mind for HRRC. A survey of potential sources of data (the refugees) needed to be undertaken. This turned out to be Parsons' mission. Ironically, Davies was later fired by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles due to pressure from the McCarthyites and the China Lobby who found him insufficiently supportive of Chiang Kaishek.

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So the Carnegie Corporation, not unexpectedly pursuing a strategy in aid of U.S. corporate and financial interests, promoted a think tank whose primary function was to serve those interests. It did so by using its scholarly resources to advance the assumptions of cold war ideology. Carnegie, not Harvard, determined overall research priorities, and even named the personnel who would operate the HRRC. Carnegie vetted the center's scholars who then pursued a research agenda largely funded and determined by government intelligence agencies, utilizing sources, the access to which was also provided by intelligence agencies. The core objective of the research, as determined by the U.S. Air Force, which provided principal funding, was to study the Soviet Union's various populations as potential bombing targets based on analyses of the psychological vulnerability of those populations, an approach derived from surveys of German and Japanese populations after the Second World War.[9]

From the point of view of corporate America, the cold war was a logical strategy flowing from the assumption that made "American economic prosperity coterminous with global hegemony outside the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," as sociologist William Domhoff has written.[10] The cold war provided an ideological framework for Harvard's project in Germany, which began with Parsons' 1948 trip. Parsons' anti-communism, conflated in his mind with anti-totalitarianism, allowed him to ignore the unsavory nature of some of his research sources as well as the Air Force's research agenda targeting the Soviet Union's civilian population.

Which brings us back to the strange scholarship of Uta Gerhardt. If we did not know better, we would assume from her book that Parsons absented himself from political involvement in Germany following 1946 and never set foot in that country again.

But we do know better. The historian Jon Wiener stumbled upon Charles O'Connell's doctoral dissertation, then still in draft form, and wrote an article for the March 6, 1989 *Nation* describing Parsons' efforts to smuggle "Nazi collaborators" into the United States as Soviet studies

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experts in some detail. Gerhardt, it turns out, was aware of Wiener's article when she wrote her book.

Then sociologist, Jack Nusan Porter, wrote an extremely favorable review of Gerhardt's book for the September, 1994 *Sociological Forum*, the journal of the Eastern Sociological Society.[11] Porter felt that Gerhardt portrayed Parsons in a new light, as an anti-totalitarian activist, thus undermining his New Left critics who, like C. Wright Mills, had painted Parsons as a conservative. "...in our youthful certainty," Porter wrote, "we were too hard on him...Far from being the 'reactionary' that the 1960s antiwar activists thought of him...this book makes it clear that Parsons was a strong supporter of human rights in the fight for democracy against the onslaught of Nazism." Unfortunately, Porter was unaware of Wiener's *Nation* piece at the time and when he found out about it (from me), he was aghast. He (and I) made haste to try to have his review revised.

The sociological establishment then circled the wagons to protect Parsons. The journal refused to publish any amendment to Porter's review for several years. Finally, in the December 1996 *Sociological Forum* it published an extensive, if somewhat rambling, essay by Porter. But it also published in the same issue, what amounted to two lengthy defenses of Parsons, one by Gerhardt, and one by N.Y.U. sociologist Dennis Wrong, whose piece is entitled "Truth, Misinterpretation, or Left-wing McCarthyism?"[12]

In his essay, self-described social-democrat Wrong attacks Wiener's *Nation* piece as a hatchet job, attacks *The Nation* for having espoused an anti-cold war ideological line "and even printing the occasional outright Stalinist, including several suspected Soviet agents," and boasts of his own funding by Carnegie, and his connections to the late Dean Acheson of the State Department, and George Kennan. He accuses critics of the cold war of viewing matters "through the distorting lens of the slogans and cliches of the late 1960s New Left," and of being antagonistic to liberalism and social democracy, and therefore of playing into the hands of right-wing ideologues. Almost needless to say, he defends Parsons' activities in Germany. He also defends the journal in its prior decision not to publish any amendment to Porter's effusive book review. For

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Wrong, the attack on Parsons is an attack on the assumptions of the cold war, and he does his best to link a defense of Parsons to a defense of cold war strategy. In Wrong's universe it is impossible to be anti-Stalinist, and at the same time opposed to a U.S. foreign policy which, among other things, included sheltering Nazi collaborators and contemplating the incineration of civilian populations in defense of freedom. It seems beyond Wrong's grasp that one might be a critic precisely *because* one is antitotalitarian.

Wrong's simplistic cold warriorism and old-fashioned red-baiting aside, why are so many sociologists apparently enlisted to defend Parsons' reputation at this late date? The matter of Talcott Parsons' "missing years" is known, though not widely. It would seem that there are people who prefer to keep it that way. Still, what harm would it do to put the historical record straight nearly fifty years on? Or are Talcott Parsons and the Harvard Russian Research Center really not the issue? Is it a discussion of the nature of power, of the role of dominant institutions and their role in formulating university research agendas that is troublesome? Or is it the prospect that the figleaf of academic value neutrality and "scientific" objectivity may, in fact, be demythologized, thus challenging the legitimacy of foundations and think tanks as well as the venerable university, a status that has been in careful repair since the end of the Vietnam War?

NOTES

1. Uta Gerhardt, *Talcott Parsons on National Socialism,* Aldine de Gruyter, 1993.
2. The two main sources for this information, including their footnotes, are: Sigmund Diamond, *Compromised Campus. The Collaboration of Universities With the Intelligence Community 1945-1955,* (Oxford University Press, 1992); and Charles Thomas O'Connell, *Social Structure and Science: Soviet Studies at Harvard,* doctoral dissertation, UCLA, 1990. See also Jon Wiener, "Bringing Nazi Sympathizers to the U.S.," *The Nation,* April 6,1989.
3. Diamond, p.95 and 308 n. 26.

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4. The following have information about these interlocks: Edward H. Berman, *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy,* (SUNY Press, 1983); Ellen C. Lagemann, *The Politics of Knowledge,* (Wesleyan University Press, 1989); Laurence Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust; The Council on Foreign Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy,* (Monthly Review Press, 1977); Michael Wala, *The Council on Foreign Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War,* (Berghan, 1994); and David E. Weischadle, "The Carnegie Corporation and the Shaping of American Educational Policy," in Robert F. Arnove (ed.), *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations At Home and Abroad,* G.K. Hall, 1980. See also the *Annual Reports,* Council on Foreign Relations.
5. *Who's Who In America.*
6. William H. Tucker, *The Science and Politics of Racial Research,* (University of Illinois Press, 1994), p.173.
7. O'Connell, pp.115-125.
8. Shoup and Minter, p.34.
9. O'Connell, ch. 7.
10. G. William Domhoff, *The Power Elite and the State,* (Aldine de Gruyter, 1990), p.108.
11. Jack Nusan Porter, "Toward a Sociology of National Socialism," *Sociological Forum,* v.9 no.3, September 1994.
12. Jack Nusan Porter, "Talcott Parsons and National Socialism: The Case of the Ten Mysterious Missing Letters"; Dennis Wrong, "Truth, Misinterpretation, or Left-Wing McCarthyism?"; Uta Gerhardt, "Scholarship, Not Scandal," *Sociological Forum,* v.11 no.4, December 1996.

It is impossible, in light of historical experiences, to believe that there is hope of salvation for humanity in a society where the exploited are to look to their exploiters for redemption. Their ways of life are too different; the common bond that links them together is too fragile not to break after a period of strain. Only in a social order where men know by the operation of its laws that the well-being of each is part of the well-being of the others, and not a subtraction from it, is there the effective right to look for enduring peace. There have been moments in history when, in an adventure which pushes the frontiers of experiences beyond those limits which logic can control, some man, more deeply imaginative or more profoundly human then his contempraries, has caught a glimpse of the road along which that adventure lies; just as there have been moments, too, when the depths of the insight that this glimpse has brought has communicated its own ecstasy to others, and built thereby the frontiers of our world nearer the road on which freedom can be found.

—Harold J. Laski, *Faith, Reason and Civilization*

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NUCLEAR CLOUDS OVER THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND JAPAN

by TOSHIMARU OGURA and INGYU OH

The stories on the dangers of nuclear conflict in East Asia are so twisted and distorted in the mass media in the United States, South Korea, and Japan that the masses seem to believe that the only solution to the problem is to dismantle the Stalinist regime in North Korea, forceably or peacefully. The heart of the problem, however, is to be found in the fact that it is not just North Korea, but South Korea and Japan as well, that have always wanted to realize the dream of owning atomic bombs and missiles.

Our attempt here is to present an alternative perspective on the current Northeast Asian nuclear crisis by explaining the governmental efforts in South Korea and Japan toward nuclear armament. It is our belief that the real causes of the current nuclear crisis are the triangular alliance of the United States-Japan-South Korea and the spread of market capitalism in this region, particularly in North Korea. But, what makes the current nuclear crisis more complex than the traditional East-West nuclear stalemate is the evolving division within the triangular alliance itself. Capitalist and nationalist competition among the United States, Japan, and South Korea may emerge as a serious threat to future stability in Northeast Asia.

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In the following we offer an analysis of the current nuclear crisis in Northeast Asia, emphasizing traditional cold war ideology and the rise of nationalist competition.

Nuclear Politics on the Korean Peninsula

Nuclear bombs do (or did) exist both in South Korea and Japan, although international legal provisions prohibit these countries from developing nuclear arms as a condition of their membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The U.S. forces stationed in these two countries have secretly maintained nuclear missile bases. Because of this, North Korea now wants to develop nuclear missiles in addition to its midrange non-nuclear missiles. The rationale for North Korea's nuclear armament is the increased threat to its own regime due to the fall of the communist bloc in the East. North Korea's move to develop nuclear arms thus constitutes what the United States, Japan, and South Korea perceive as the Northeast Asian nuclear crisis.

The result of the Northeast Asian nuclear crisis is what we call quasi- or virtual nuclear armament by all concerned countries—North Korea, South Korea, and Japan. By quasi-nuclear armament, we mean a national defense capacity which can produce a nuclear bomb in a relatively short period.

The Hidden History of Nuclear Development in Korea

Nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula is not a novel issue. The United States ignited the first nuclear threat in a country that had just experienced one of the most fratricidal civil wars in human history. In 1958 the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) stored nuclear arms in its military bases, including those near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The threat of using nuclear arms by the U.S. forces against North Korea and/or China, however, has always been present since the division of Korea in 1945. Several declassified internal Defense Department documents testify that the U.S. forces would have used atomic bombs during the Korean War if the Soviet army had entered the war, or if the entire USFK had been evacuated from Korea.[1]

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The 1958 decision by the United States to store nuclear weapons in South Korea escalated the fear of the North Korean government. The North immediately sought ways to expedite transfers of nuclear technologies from the Soviet Union. It acquired its first nuclear institute and imported a 1,000 Kw reactor from the Soviet Union during the 1964-1965 period. Since then the North Korean government has built thirteen other reactors and related facilities, mainly in the much suspected Youngbyun area. Developments of heavy-water reactor systems in Youngbyun heightened western suspicion that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons.

In addition to the U.S. nuclear missiles stored in South Korea, this East Asian country started developing independent nuclear technologies. The decline of the U.S. military presence in East Asia, especially after the U.S. disengagement from Vietnam and the election of Jimmy Carter, led the South Korean military dictator, Park Chung Hee (1962-1978), to believe that he could no longer rely solely on the United States as a bulwark against the communist aggression from the North. Much of the latter half of the 1970s witnessed South Korean flagrant efforts to procure plutonium and acquire necessary nuclear technologies. Although Park cited the threats from the North to justify his secret nuclear program, the real motivation was to strengthen his dictatorial power from opposition politicians, student movement leaders, and worker strikes.

South Korea finally completed the Kori plant in 1970. The country subsequently mastered the technology of building reactors in the late 1970s, and it now possesses eight light-water and one heavy-water reactors, promising to build forty-one more by 2025. South Korea, however, does not have domestic uranium mines, nor does it possess uranium processing technologies. The United States has processed fifty-five percent of all South Korea's uranium needs and France the rest. What makes South Korea equally suspect along with North Korea is its recent decision to develop uranium processing technologies in cooperation with Russia. In November 1990, for instance, forty tons of Russian uranium and a handful of technicians arrived in Pusan.

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However, a more important technological issue is whether both Koreas have acquired plutonium reprocessing technologies. U.S. intelligence sources maintain that North Korea has already acquired core technologies sufficient to reprocess plutonium. A defector from the North, Kim Chung Min, also confirmed recently that in 1987 North Korea had successfully extracted and reprocessed fifteen kg of plutonium from the used fuel. Strangely, these allegations were not confirmed by any IAEA inspection carried out in 1994.

There is clear evidence that the South Korean government attempted to build not only a plutonium reprocessing plant but a bomb as well. In 1975, for instance, Park Chung Hee with help from France and India tried not only to import plutonium but to build his own plutonium reprocessing plant as a response to Jimmy Carter's decision to withdraw the USFK from South Korea. In recent testimony in the Korean National Assembly, Assemblyman Kang Chang Sung (ex-commander of the South Korean Military Security Command) confirmed that Park Chung Hee had openly assured the near-completion of the bomb in 1978, the year Park was assassinated. Also, a former Korean Assemblyman, Sunwoo Ryun, testified in the same Assembly session that some Korean nuclear scientist had reported to Park Chung Hee that the bomb would be completed in 1981.

During a much publicized conflict between Carter and Park, the United States in 1982 successfully had forced Park to halt any suspicious nuclear programs. This Park–Carter conflict was not without human casualty, however. A U.S.–based Korean nuclear physicist, Yi Whee So, who had accepted Park's invitation to join Korea's nuclear research team, was mysteriously killed in an automobile accident. Some believe that Park Chung Hee's death was related to this Carter–Park conflict. To attain U.S. recognition, therefore, it was necessary for the military government that took power in 1981 to abort this secret nuclear program.[2]

South Korea's interest in developing plutonium reprocessing technologies flared up once again in August 1990, when the government announced that it will independently develop a 150,000 Kw high breeder reactor by 2010. The

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government has also promised to promote the development of plutonium recycling technologies for commercial use. Experts estimate that South Korea will possess about twenty-four tons of plutonium by the year 2000, despite international sanctions and legal obstacles.[3]

Both Koreas have various nuclear arms delivery systems. For instance, South Korea successfully launched missiles with non-nuclear warheads in 1978. Its Air Force also maintains sixty F-16s and other sophisticated combat airplanes and bombers that can carry nuclear bombs. The South Korean Army can also fire nuclear shells using its 105 mm and 205 mm artillery. The North Korean Air Force for its part possesses several MIG-29s and SU-25s that can deliver atomic bombs, and the country can launch nuclear missiles.

A Nuclear Cooperation Between Both Koreas Against Japan?

This surprising scenario was widely disseminated in 1989 when a monthly political magazine in South Korea initially revealed the inside stories of what had really happened during the secret trip of Yi Hu Rak, then Chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, to Pyungyang in 1971. The magazine claimed that Yi and Kim Il-Sung exchanged a verbal agreement that both governments should cooperate in the development and production of nuclear bombs to defend the peninsula from Japanese aggression.[4]

The secret deal has never been confirmed by either Korea, nor has it ever been carried out. However, an American journalist, Dan Overdofer, in his phone conversation with one of the authors, claimed that Chung Hong Jin, then Yi's KCIA aide during the Pyungyang visit, had confirmed such a deal between two Koreas.[5] Given that no significant cooperation between North and South actually occurred, we believe that these suspicions of nuclear cooperation are nothing but political survival tactics employed by two dictators to maintain public loyalty to their regimes. Indeed, the popular support among South Koreans for the alleged North–South cooperation is massive. This is why such an ultra-nationalistic novel as *Mugunghwa Ggot'ch'i P'iot'ssupnida* [The rose of Sharon has blossomed] (1993) became a best seller in South Korea. Kim

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Chin Myong, the author of this novel, writes a war scenario in which two Koreas in cooperation drop an atomic bomb near Tokyo to defeat a Japanese invasion. Furthermore, it was this novel that tried to legitimate Park's unfulfilled struggle to develop an atomic bomb. Public opinion strongly disapproved of the U.S. reaction to the North Korean nuclear threat and even, in some cases, glorified Park's strong stance against Carter. It was also this novel that aroused anti-Japanese sentiment among South Koreans, most of whom now take it for granted that Japan, with its economic and military might, will be the first enemy of a unified Korea.

Revisionism and Pro-Nuclear Sentiments in Japan

The political aftermath of the U.S. military strategies in South Korea and its current policies of pressuring North Korea toward market liberalization has led to a South Korean policy shift to conservatism and possible nuclear armament. Virtual nuclear armament on the Korean peninsula, along with that of China and Russia, has given a momentum to Japanese conservatives who touted nuclear armament.

International Suspicions of Japanese Nuclear Armament

In 1994 the international community paid close attention to the suspicious activities of the Japanese government. Japan's importation of plutonium during the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula made daily headlines. Reasons for such suspicions were many. First, the nuclear domino theory predicts a rational move by Japan to adopt nuclear weapons programs as neighboring countries develop similar arms. Second, Japan has already installed high breeder reactors. Third, Japanese space technologies and facilities can easily be converted to nuclear missile production. Fourth, the Japanese government was not willing to ratify the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Siding with the dominant Japanese public opinion, the Japanese government vehemently denied such allegations. The government argued that the peace clause within the Japanese Constitution and the historical fact that Japan was

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the first victim of the nuclear bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki would prevent any nuclear armament in Japan. Furthermore, it maintained, the Three Non-nuclear Principles are still intact, as well as the internal legal provisions that prohibit any military use of atomic energy. Despite these excuses, as we show below, evidence of secret nuclear programs in Japan is sufficient to support the international accusation of Japan's potential or actual nuclear armament. After all, the late Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru had made it clear in a press conference in the 1950s that: "Japan should develop atomic and hydrogen bombs to compete with the Soviet Union."[6]

Secret Policies of Nuclear Armament in Japan

Since the end of the 1960s, the Japanese government has examined the possibility of developing nuclear weapons. Clandestine nuclear programs instantly violated the Three Non-nuclear Principles, which were introduced in a 1968 administrative speech by then Prime Minister Satô Eisaku. The principles banned producing, possessing, or transporting any nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil. In an attempt to transgress these principles, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote a confidential document, called "Wagakuni no Gaikô Seisaku Taikô" [The Outline of the Foreign Policy of Our Country] in 1969. The second part of this document, which became declassified in 1994, is titled, "Policies on Security." Although this document made it clear that Japan would not possess nuclear weapons regardless of its decision whether to participate in the NPT, authors of the document strongly suggested that the Japanese government always maintain necessary technological and economic capabilities to produce nuclear arms. Furthermore, they emphasized the necessity of educating Japanese people to support the production of nuclear arms during emergency situations.[7]

The "Outline" lost much of its influence as Japan finally decided to accept protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and to ratify the NPT in 1976. The Foreign Policy Committee, which had authored the "Outline," then, was renamed Seisaku Kikaku Kyôgi [Policy Project Conference] and merged into

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Sôgô Gaikô Seisaku Kyoku [General Foreign Policy Bureau] in 1993. Yet we should notice that Japan took more than six years to ratify the NPT because ultra–conservatives of the Liberal Democratic Party raised serious opposition. Their argument was that the NPT would eventually take away Japan's "nuclear card."

The Self–Defense Force was much more responsible than any other Japanese governmental agency for developing clandestine nuclear programs. For instance, in the middle of the 1960s, then Director General Matsuno Raizo examined the possibility of possessing a nuclear submarine. Although this plan was not realized, technological accumulation from several research efforts allowed Japan to develop a nuclear-powered ship, Mutsu, for civilian use. In a similar vein, leading members of the Self–Defense Force secretly organized a private research group in 1970. This research group, led by Uchida Kazuomi, then Chief of Staff of the Maritime Self Defense Force, particularly examined the possibility of developing nuclear torpedos.[8]

Even at present, the Japanese government does not conceal its nuclear ambition. In July 1994 the government petitioned the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to grant Japan future nuclear possession. This diplomatic effort was a response to the World Health Organization's (WHO) publicly released opinion in May 1993 that "from the point of view of the influence on human health and the environment, nuclear weapon use is illegal." The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately tried to countervail the WHO's opinion by emphasizing that the WHO cannot issue any opinion on international politics. The ministry affirmed that nuclear weapon use does not violate international laws although it may jeopardize the WHO's humanitarian goal. The ministry's reasoning was based on three points. First, the NPT and international common law do not explicitly define the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. Second, if the use of nuclear weapons is illegal, then the possession of nuclear arms by the members of the "nuclear club" also have to be denied by the ICJ. Third, the legality of the use of nuclear arms has been an official opinion of the Liberal Democratic Party since 1955.

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After its appeal was filed with the ICJ, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs faced criticisms from concerned domestic and foreign groups. Critics argued that the Hague Treaty of 1907 explicitly prohibits mass murders by noncombatant bombing on a defenseless city. Also, the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 ruled that the use of nuclear weapons violates the United Nations Charter. Moreover, during a 1963 lawsuit against the Japanese government by the victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, the Tokyo district court had already ruled that the use of nuclear weapons violates international laws. Yet, despite the criticism, the ministry continued to argue that the legality of the use of atomic weapons remains the opinion of the government.

Another indication that the Japanese government is seriously considering nuclear armament is Prime Minister Hata's statement. On 17 June, 1994, right after the ICJ incident, the Prime Minister readily concluded at a press conference that from the technological, financial, and economic aspects, Japan has the ability to produce nuclear weapons. This statement was the first of its kind from a Japanese prime minister that openly confirmed virtual nuclear armament. Hata's remark caused a huge sensation, although the Japanese Diet and mass media did not launch any systematic investigation into virtual armament by Japan.

The Technological Possibility of Nuclear Armament in Japan

Tsuchida Atsuji, a physicist and antinuclear activist confirmed earlier that Japan had achieved virtual nuclear armament status.[9] In his assessment, Tsuchida pays special attention to Risaikuru Kiki Shiken Shisetsu [Recycling Equipment Test Facilities] (RETF) that the Japanese government had begun constructing since 1993. According to Tsuchida, the RETF is for the production of high purity plutonium that is not adequate for commercial use. He states that:

> The Japanese government planned secretly to exploit ninety-eight percent high purity plutonium, element number 239, by reprocessing used blanket fuel from the high speed breeder reactor, Jôyô. In Spring of 1993, the government started to construct the RETF using a total budget of twelve billion Yen.[10]

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Japanese mass media have been very silent about the RETF plan. For this Tsuchida notes that: "All of the mass media seem to be doing self regulation by not reporting anything about the RETF, especially about the reprocessing of Jôyô's blanket." The RETF maintains facilities that can produce nuclear bombs, although it calls them "Test Facilities." According to Tsuchida, the Science and Technology Agency and Dônen use "false names in order to try to evade embarrassing questions from mass media and members of the Diet."

Tsuchida warns that the forty kg of plutonium that existed at Jôyô in 1993 could produce twenty tactical nuclear weapons by the RETF. The plutonium came mainly from two reactors, Jôyô and Monju. Another scholar, Mashita Toshiki, also warns that Monju can produce about seventy kg of super class plutonium when the reactor is operated for one year. Mashita continues that each three kg of the plutonium is enough for one nuclear bomb. According to Mashita, Japan has the ability to produce dozens of nuclear warheads for H2 rockets, using the high speed breeder reactor and the RETF.

The United States also played a role in all these Japanese efforts at virtual nuclear armament. Mashita points out that the United States transferred necessary technologies for the REFT. The REFT uses nuclear technologies that the United States itself developed. Although the United States gave up developing actual proof plant for high speed breeder reactors in the 1980s, it still retains technological knowledge advanced from the early Manhattan Project. The United States transferred these technological advances to the RETF in Japan. Amid the public's naivete and ignorance about what the RETF can eventually produce, Japan will easily obtain all necessary technology for producing atomic weapons.

Can Legal Provisions Block Nuclear Armament?

Despite the technological capabilities of Japan, many wonder if it can actually produce a bomb, given legal constraints. The Japanese mass media answers NO to this question, citing the constitutional war renunciation clause. The Three Non–Nuclear Principles, and the Principal Law of

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Nucleus. Howerver, such principles—we argue—have mainly served to provide cover for the development of a nuclear arms capability, and may well be dispensed with once that capability has been well established.

The weakness of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles can be seen from the fact that the Japanese government has maintained its united view that the war renunciation clause does not explicitly ban nuclear armament. The installation of high breeder reactors itself testifies to the futility of the war renunciation clause, since this kind of breeder necessitates a stable supply of high quality plutonium. Furthermore, the Three Non–Nuclear Principles failed to block the deployment of nuclear arms in Japan by the U.S. army. The biggest ammunition storehouse for the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan is the Kadena base in Okinawa. Despite official denial by the Japanese government, the U.S. army has secretly stored nuclear arms in Okinawa for decades, and the existence of nuclear weapons in Japan up to today remains a public secret that every Japanese citizen knows.

Could Public Opinion Block Nuclear Armament?

Public opinion against nuclear armament in Japan poses the biggest obstacle to the Japanese government and the right wing in their collective pursuit of developing nuclear arms. Any governmental or bureaucratic hint about the likelihood of nuclear armament in that country has been always followed by public criticisms of the strictest sort. Therefore, Japanese government has been limited in the free use of the nuclear card in its diplomatic negotiations with North Korea, China, and the ex-Soviet Union. However, Japanese public opinion is rapidly shifting to a neo-conservatism which many Japanese call "revisionism."

Revisionism is an ultra-right wing interpretation of the Japanese view that the Pacific War with the U.S. was a defensive maneuver against American imperialism. Public opinion in Japan has transformed dramatically since the dispatching of the Self–Defense Force (PKO) overseas after the Gulf War. Little public protest followed the decision by the Japanese government to provide this "international contribution" through its Self–Defense Force.

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Passage of the PKO legally enabled the right wing dream of resuming Japan's military engagement in other countries. Thus, the PKO resulted in the dispatch of the Self–Defense Force to Cambodia and Somalia one after another, and now the government is considering another dispatch of similar scale to the Golan Heights. One dangerous possibility of the PKO is the sending of the Japanese troops to the Korean peninsula if any military collision or dispute occurs there. The PKO thus can serve the right wing's purpose of regaining Japanese military and economic hegemony in East Asia.

The content of Japanese hegemony in East Asia includes economic exploitation of neighboring countries and the consolidation of the ideology of Japanese supremacy. The conservative wing of the Liberal Democratic Party retains much of the legacy of ultra–right wing racism and imperialism toward other ethnic groups in Asia. The racist orientation of the Japanese right wing has been carefully concealed by its anti-communist ideology. After the collapse of Soviet Union, these conservative politicians in Japan began to argue openly that the Pacific War, which they call Daitôa Sensô [The Great East Asian War], was not a Japanese invasion into neighboring East Asian countries, but a war of liberation from Western imperialism. The majority of these revisionists ironically constitute the pro-South Korean faction in the Liberal Democratic Party. This irony implies that pro-South Korea sentiment in Japan is nothing but a facade for Japanese imperialism and a strategic use of South Korea for Japanese hegemony vis-a-vis North Korea and China.

In an interview with *Asahi Shimbun*, Okuno Seisuke, an influential politician in the Liberal Democratic Party and chairman of a pressure group against the "no-war resolution" in the Diet, insisted that Daitôa Sensô be a war of self-defense and liberation from Western imperialists for Asian peoples. He and other party members opposed the "no-war resolution," which the Diet eventually passed. To these revisionists the resolution literally meant to give up the right of invasion for self-defense. This term, "self-defense," therefore, means not only self defense for the Japanese people but any form of Japanese invasion into other neighboring Asian countries in

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the name of self-defense. This revisionist logic, if maintained and applied to other international conflicts, can legitimize not only nuclear armament but also possible invasion into Korea during emergency situations. And this is why we argued above that the unification of two Koreas alone will not solve other security problems apparent in this region. The reunification of Korea, a political solution for an old ideological conflict between the East and the West, by no means is a long term solution to a more fundamental problem of the historical clash of ultra-nationalism that has been strong on both sides of the Korean Strait.

Conclusion

North Korea, South Korea, and Japan have achieved quasi- or virtual nuclear armament. Although these countries do not produce or possess actual bombs, they possess sufficient technological know-how to possess one or several nuclear arsenals. Thus, virtual armament creates a new nightmare in this region—nuclear annihilation. Given the concentration of economic affluence and military power in this region and its growing importance to the world system, any hot conflict among these countries would threaten to escalate into a global conflagration.

We have argued that the current U.S. diplomatic effort to open up North Korea through age-old tactics of carrots and sticks on the one hand and divide and rule on the other will only threaten regional peace. We have provided reasons why the current nuclear crisis in this region should be interpreted as having two different dimensions, and the U.S. diplomatic attempt to tranquilize the North Korean nuclear efforts on the one hand and open up the Stalinist regime on the other would only jeopardize long term peace. In all aspects of the crisis, we should not overlook the traditional conflict of ultra-nationalism between Korea and Japan.

An adequate solution to this two fold problem—ideological and nationalist conflict—is to organize mass social movements both in Korea and Japan for the promotion of social justice and democracy from below. Replacement of conservative-capitalist and Stalinist regimes in South Korea,

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Japan, and North Korea by genuinely democratic forces in those societies can realize peaceful reunification between the North and the South and bring in friendly cooperation between Korea and Japan for the betterment of social and economic conditions for their citizens. The current political economic structure of capitalist conservatism can only fan and fuel an arms race, and nuclear armament that may eventually destroy the entire population of this region. On the other hand, peoples' movements will successfully attenuate U.S. hegemony in this region that has plagued East Asia's democracy and social justice by advancing American capitalist interests.

NOTES

1. See the following documents written by The Department of Army: "The Psychological Aspects of the Use of Atomic Bombs on the Korean Peninsula," 6 July, 1950; "The Use of Atomic Bombs on the Korean Peninsula," 14 July, 1950; "The Policy of the Department of Army Regarding the Use of Atomic Bombs on the Korean Peninsula," 20 November, 1951. These policy drafts suggest that both the U.S. army involved in the Korean war and the Korean governments should be prepared to educate the Korean public as to the necessity of using the bomb. The Department of Army intended to use at least twelve bombs on the Korean peninsula.
2. *The Choson Ilbo*, 6 October 1995.
3. Kim Chang Soo, "Pundan Sidae ui Gunsa Daekyul Kucho e Daehan Pikyo Punsok." In *Pundan 50 Nyon ui Kucho wa Hyunsil* [The Structure and Reality of the Fifty Years of Division], edited by Kisayon Tongil Yonku Wiwonhoi. Seoul: CISJD, 1994, pp. 139–210.
4. See *Wolgan Joongang* March 1989.
5. Dan Overdofer gave a speech on this topic in Washington, D.C. in 1995 and is writing a book on the subject to be published by Addison-Wesley in 1997.
6. Yoshida's comment on the nuclear issue was the first of its kind by the head of the Japanese government. See Ishihara Shintarô, Watanabe Shôichi, and Ogawa Kazuhisa, *Soredemo Nô To Ieru Nippon* [Japan Which can Still Say "No"], Tokyo: Kobusha. 1990.
7. Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu, "Usagi no Mimi to Hato no Yume" [The Ear of a Rabbit and the Dream of a Dove]. Riberuta Shuppan 1995, pp. 16-17.
8. Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Ibid.*, p. 243.
9. Tsuchida Atsuji, "Kakubusô o Junbisuru Dônen Saishori Kôjô" [Donen Reprocess Factory Where Nuclear Armament is Prepared]. In Gijutsu to Ningen [Technology and Human Beings], November 1993.
10. Tsuchida, *Ibid.*, p. 13.

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CRY "HAVOC!" AND LET SLIP THE DOGS OF WAR: McCARTHYISM, KOREA, AND OTHER NIGHTMARES

by DOUG DOWD

I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness, starving hysterical naked,
dragging themselves through the negro streets at dawn looking for an angry fix,
angelheaded hipsters burning for the ancient heavenly connection to the starry dynamo in the machinery of night...

—Allen Ginsberg, "Howl"

The college students of the 1950s were characterized—and reproached—as "the silent generation." There was, to be sure, a certain kind of silence; but, as one who was teaching during those years either in California or New York, I remember it as mysterious, the quasi-silence of a simmering pot.

There was substantial reason for students (among others) to simmer and smoke: the decade of the 1950s was rife with enormous changes demanding discussion and protest, but they were also years in which discussion and protest were punished in punishing ways. They were the years par excel-

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lence of McCarthyism and the simultaneous escalation of the cold war, at home and abroad.

The years from 1945 through 1952, the Truman era, were those in which it seemed that through a mad magician's sleight of hand a victorious, immeasurably strong and free nation found itself ensnared by an Attorney General's List of Subversive Organizations, a Presidential Loyalty Review Board, purges of "reds" in the entertainment industry, the renewed military draft, a war as bloody in its effects as it was mystified in its origins and name (a "United Nations Police Action") in Korea, and, neither last nor least, loyalty oaths in unions and universities.

Into the Valley of Death

The seemingly endless horror of the war in Vietnam—the longest ever, and the most clearcut defeat for the United States—has allowed the much briefer but even more murderous Korean war to slip from popular memory,[1] as regards its origins, its nature, and its consequences. Yet it may be asserted that had it not been for the Korean war, and the McCarthyism and agitation over the Chinese revolution that accompanied and intensified it, the war in Indochina (and much else) would have been a lot less likely.[2]

Korea was the first hot war of the cold war, and it was very hot indeed: its death toll remains by far the largest of the period, it took the world closer to nuclear conflagration than ever since (even including the 1962 Cuban missile crisis), and its ramifications seem to be endless.

The formal war lasted three years, from June 1950 into July 1953. Like the war in Vietnam, it was a civil war; and both wars required a massive involvement of U.S. troops and weaponry if the civil war was not to be quickly won by "the other side."[3]

Let us look first at the devastation the war caused in Korea, and then ask how and why it began, and why it was so ferocious.

The total number of people killed was almost certainly well over 3 million—possibly more like 4 million—in a nation whose population was some 30 million when the war started. Although these

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figures may seem high, if one takes into account the almost unbelievable intensity of the bombing, the shortage of medical facilities, the lack of food and the extreme cold and lack of shelter in the context of a scorched-earth policy and the systematic destruction of livestock, they are not implausible. By far the largest number died in North Korea.... Our estimate is that over 2 million North Korean civilians died and about 500,000 North Korean soldiers. In addition, some 1 million Chinese soldiers probably died (although one first-hand Chinese source has put the figure at 3 million). South Korean civilian deaths were about 1 million; Southern battle-related deaths were some 47,000; non-battle-related military deaths were probably higher. US deaths are put at 54,246, of whom 33,629 were "battle deaths." The total number of battle deaths among other forces came to 3,194....[4]

From the beginning, General Douglas MacArthur was in charge of the U.S. (or, as it was called the "U.N.") effort.[5] He was removed by President Truman in April of 1951 for his headstrong interpretation of his powers (and refusal to see Truman as Commander-in-Chief), and his clear intent to carry the war into and over the skies of China by any means possible.[6] There were still two years of intensive ground fighting, conventional and napalm bombing, and naval shelling to be endured when MacArthur observed (in 1951, before Congress):

> The war in Korea has almost destroyed that nation. I have never seen such devastation. I have seen, I guess, as much blood and disaster as any living man, and it just curdled my stomach the last time I was there. After I looked at that wreckage and those thousands of women and children and everything, I vomited. (Halliday and Cumings, op. cit., p. 152)

MacArthur had only seen the South. The North was bombed and burned much worse, and much worse was on its way. *Item:* up to the last days of the war, the U.S. Navy shelled the northern coastal city of Wonsan twenty-four hours a day uninterruptedly for 861 days. (During most of the period, peace negotiations were going on.) *Item:* Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, was reduced to something less than rubble; photographs of it in 1953 seem to be of Hiroshima. *Item:* in the last year of the war, the main hydroelectric dams providing most of the North's electric power were blasted to uselessness.

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Item: napalm, much of it manufactured in Japan, was being dropped ceaselessly on villages throughout the North for three years, leaving nothing of life behind.[7]

What motivated such seemingly mindless destructiveness?

More: what was it that led MacArthur—and also Truman and Acheson—to propose and prepare for the use of atomic bombs in Korea and China?[8] How and why did Korea take on such proportions? As the war was coming to a close, this is what Churchill said:

> Korea does not really matter now. I'd never heard of the bloody place until I was seventy-four. Its importance lies in the fact that it has led to the re-arming of America.[9]

Not quite as eloquent as some of Churchill's other pronouncements, but close to the bones of truth: as for so many other countries that have become graveyards, Korea's tragedy was a means to the larger ends of the Superpowers. Was it at least an end that can be dignified in words? It seems not. What did bring war to Korea?

The general and lasting impression about the origins of the Korean war, especially in the United States, is simple, too simple: North Korea invaded South Korea. Indeed there was such an invasion. But that fact, when examined in its historical context, raises more questions than it answers.

Japan established a "protectorate" over Korea in 1905, annexed it a few years later, used it and abused it in ways customary to colonial powers and, during the war, went beyond the established boundaries of even those cruelties and indecencies.[10] And then in 1945,

> Japanese armies, according to Soviet-American agreement, were disarmed north of the 38th parallel by Russia and south of the line by the United States. Lengthy conferences failed to unify the nation, for neither the Soviets nor the Americans wanted to chance the possibility that a unified Korea would move into the opposing camp.[11]

From the moment of its establishment as a dividing line, the 38th parallel took on a life of its own, and became a looming Frankenstein monster. The "line that was found . . . cut across natural areas of geographic, cultural, and climatic

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continuity."[12] How and why was the dividing line established? The answer to that question well represents the deadly mix of accident and design, strategy and hysteria, that underlay U.S. foreign policy as the 1950s began.

The Soviet Union had promised the United States it would declare war on Japan no more than three months after the end of the European war. In the event, that meant early August 1945; and it also implied the probability of Soviet troops in Manchuria and Korea. The importance of this probability and, among other matters, its role in creating the 38th parallel deserve sustained attention:

> If the Soviet Union dominated Korea, it could undermine Chiang Kai-Shek's position in China and place the security of Japan in jeopardy. Truman began to search for a way to occupy Korea unilaterally, thereby removing any chance for Sovietization. His decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan was in part aimed at forcing Tokyo to surrender quickly and thereby preempting Soviet entry into the Pacific war. The gamble failed. [The atom bomb was dropped first on August 6.] On August 8 Stalin acted to ensure that he would play a role in reconstructing East Asia after World War II, declaring war on Japan prior to its surrender and sending the Red Army into Korea. Two days later, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee instructed Colonels C.H. Bonesteel and Dean Rusk [later JFK's and LBJ's Secretary of State] to find a line in Korea that would harmonize the political desire to have U.S. forces receive the surrender [of Japan] as far north as possible with the inability of the closest U.S. troops on Okinawa to reach the area before the Soviets occupied the entire peninsula.... Many American leaders doubted if Stalin would accept the proposal, but the Soviet leader agreed, probably in hopes of receiving a voice in the reconstruction of Japan. Truman's refusal to grant Stalin an equal role in determining Japan's future meant that Korea's reunification was unlikely from the start.[13]

Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States ever consulted with the Korean people at any level as to their wishes in this matter—naturally. As even the then conservative (usually GOP) *Herald Tribune* noted in its November 24, 1945, editorial, "There has never been a reasonable excuse for [splitting Korea in two parts], which divides a homogenous people. It is creating new political problems. The Koreans are being indoctrinated with Communistic ideas in the north and

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with theories of Western democracies in the south."[14] For the Koreans, when the Japanese occupation ended, two more began, followed shortly by perhaps the most ferocious war in history, in which a minimum of ten percent of Korea's population was killed, as some multiple of that was wounded, displaced and, in one way or another, damaged in who knows what ways, and for how long?

We need not dwell on the details of that civil war except to note the intermittent and serious fighting in both the North and South, but especially in the region surrounding the 38th parallel, between the main elements of the Korean civil struggle, always increasing toward 1949 and 1950.

> The basic issues over which the war in 1950 was fought were apparent immediately after liberation [1945], within a three-month period, and led to open fighting that eventually claimed more than one hundred thousand lives in peasant rebellion, labor strife, guerrilla warfare, and open fighting along the thirty-eighth parallel—all this before the ostensible Korean War began. In other words, the conflict was civil and revolutionary in character, beginning just after 1945....[15]

Both sides sought reunification, led by Syngman Rhee in the South and Kim Il Sung in the North. Both had followers on both sides of the parallel. Both had to be constrained by their external supporters, and both were. When the North invaded the South in the early morning of June 25, 1950, it was after serious attacks within the preceding forty-eight hours from the South, and months of bloody exchanges, large and small.

It is likely that Korea was going to be dominated by the Soviet Union or China, although it is generally agreed that Kim Il Sung in the decade or so following World War II sought to distance himself from the two (ultimately conflicting) giants, and that he was skilful in doing so. Two things may be said with certainty: nothing could have been more disastrous for the Korean people than the three-year war that began in 1950, and none of the powerful nations ever had the interests of the Korean people in mind. Indeed, one reason for the remorseless ferocity of the war was that all Koreans, on both sides of the parallel, were generally referred to as "gooks."[16] And what that war and its permutations have meant for the rest of the world's people, ourselves included, has yet to be

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taken as a matter for serious analysis—in, for example, high school history courses?

I (Didn't) Like Ike

Without the parenthesized word, that was the slogan of the Eisenhower campaign of 1952. The fighting stopped in July of 1953, with an armistice. Ike probably won the election of 1952 with his promise: "I shall go to Korea." He went. It is generally agreed that only a Republican—perhaps only a Republican general—could find a way out of that war for the United States (as would happen again, if in a rather more bizarre political setting, when the Vietnam war ended).

Truman, who had begun the cold war and laid the foundations for McCarthyism, could hardly have been entertained when he was accused of having given China away, and of having followed that up by placing us in an unwinnable war. One would like to have been there to hear Harry at that moment in 1952 when he was informed that McCarthy was calling for his impeachment as a traitor.

That the cold war and a belligerent foreign policy were coming to substitute for a decent concern for the society at home is suggested by the fact that even though the economy and society were moving in waves of economic well-being in his two administrations, the Truman Democrats were easily shoved out of office in the 1950s. Also, even though under Eisenhower the economy was never strongly buoyant and ended the 1950s in weakness, and his favors to big business and cronies came to be the stuff of folklore—"The New Dealers have all left Washington to make way for the car dealers," quipped Adlai in 1956—Ike's popularity never stopped growing. There is no doubt he could have been elected to a third term, had it not by then become unconstitutional.

Eisenhower had a big grin (very important for a president), tended to speak in the endearing and stumbling ways that prefigured Reagan, was seen as having won the Big War and ended the Nasty War, liked Westerns and golf, and, like Truman—like the people of the United States, it seems—favored quick and military solutions.

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Perhaps because he was an experienced soldier, Ike was not as incautious as some of our presidents have been, but he never burned the night oil searching out the complicated ways of peaceful solutions. Thus, while pushing for an armistice in Korea, he was also "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek (by then, with U.S. permission, ruling over Taiwan—ex-Japanese-ruled Formosa), taking the chance of a full-scale war with China—and who knows who else and what else.

And it was after all "on his watch," as presidents seem to be saying these years, that we—mostly meaning the CIA—overturned the democratically elected governments of Iran and of Guatemala (1953 and 1954, respectively), if it was also his administration that broke the back of the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956.[17] In doing that, Ike not only punctured the balloon of further imperialist designs by Britain and France—vain, in any case—but also increased the relative strength *and* the "responsibilities" of the United States.

Already in 1957 Ike was induced by his mentor John Foster Dulles to proclaim the "Eisenhower Doctrine"—which, after giving aid to King Hussein of Jordan against a left threat, and landing 10,000 U.S. marines in Beirut against a rumored military threat from Iraq, was permitted to disappear from our language in 1959—a change, finally, for the better.

NOTES

1. Although, as subsequent references will show, there has been an interesting and useful spate of books concerning Korea in the past ten years or so—facilitated in part by the Freedom of Information Act, in part by the diminution of the cold war itself.
2. Our first serious commitment in Vietnam took place during (and partially as a response to) the Korean war, as increasingly from 1950 on we undertook to finance the hopeless effort of the French to hold on there and in the rest of Indochina. By 1952 we were paying four-fifths of the French bill; and when they were defeated in 1954 we began our long military involvement, succeeding in keeping it covert and camouflaged in one way or another for another ten years. And then ten years of war.

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3. The weaponry provided to North Korea by the Soviet Union (which clearly stood aloof from the war) was paltry, apart from matériel left over from World War II. It was the Chinese entry that altered the balance between North Korea and the United States; but that entry would not have occurred had Truman not sent MacArthur "across the 38th parallel" in September, despite an explicit warning from Premier Chou En-lai that China would enter the war if that happened. Acheson worked on the assumption that China was controlled by the Soviet Union and that Stalin's withdrawal from involvement meant China was bluffing. See Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1990* (New York: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 114 ff. Among the many differences and similarities between the wars in Korea and Vietnam: 1) in neither case was what had been a colonialized society allowed to find its way toward independence; 2) attempts to achieve the latter were accompanied in both countries by considerable internal conflict—between bottom and top, those who had resisted and those who had worked with the former colonial power, between what were or became left and right forces; 3) both were victimized as pawns in the cold war; 4) both societies, if at different times and in different ways, found themselves arbitrarily divided in two (at the 38th parallel in Korea, at the 17th in Vietnam); 5) for both the war was a tragedy of limitless dimensions. Korea is still divided; and South Korea still has over 40,000 U.S. troops in place, equipped with nuclear weapons (as this is being written).
4. Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *Korea: The Unknown War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), pp. 200-201. This recent book is a shortened and non-academic version of the same authors' *The Fire in Korea* (also Pantheon Books) and of Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), which provide full documentation and references. The present book has many illuminating and wrenching photographs. For purposes of comparison: just under 60,000 U.S. troops died in Indochina and over 3 million Vietnamese died. The numbers for Laos are impossible to pin down. As is well-known, however, at least one million died in Cambodia in the 1970s, killed by the Khmer Rouge—which, it is vital to note, the United States (along with China !) supported (and supports still?), as a means of continuing to oppose Vietnam (which opposes the Khmer Rouge): a more horrendous combination of national madnesses and mass murder would be hard to find. The people of the United States are almost entirely ignorant of the heavy responsibility we bear for the tragedy in Cambodia, despite available essays and books that tell the story. See, for example, William Shawcross, *SIDE-SHOW: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia* (New York: Pocket Books, 1979).
5. As LaFeber points out in his authoritative study, there was "no indication that the President consulted his European or Asian allies before committing American air and naval units on June 27 [1950]. This was not the first nor would it be the last time the United States would take unilateral action in an explosive situation without consulting its Western European partners. As for the sudden American concern to bolster the United Nations, this had not been apparent when the United States acted unilaterally or with some Western powers to establish the Truman Doctrine, the Rio Pact, the Marshall Plan, and NATO. American actions in Korea were consistent with this history, for the United States. . . establish[ed] a military command in Korea that took orders not from the United Nations but from Washington." *America, Russia and the Cold War,* op. cit., pp. 103-105. LaFeber goes on to remark that "although the war was limited to Korea, Truman and Acheson

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used the war as the opportunity to develop new American policies around the globe. Because of these American initiatives, the six months between June and December 1950 rank among the most important of the Cold War era." Ibid.

6. Those who were politically attentive in 1951 will remember how electrifying the period was after MacArthur—who had been the *de facto* emperor of Japan since 1945—was removed from his command and then returned to the States. He was greeted with triumphant parades and enormous hullabaloo, and he made a dramatic attempt to gain the GOP nomination for president in 1952—which went instead to another general.
7. The economic development of Japan after 1950 had sitting at its center the direct and indirect economic stimuli provided by the U.S. military and paramilitary efforts in East and Southeast Asia. Japan served many useful military purposes for the United States: weapons and other military manufacturers, vital army and navy bases (and nuclear weapons, illegally), and R&R areas, all of these in Japan proper, or in Okinawa.
8. "[F]rom the first days of the war the Americans contemplated the use of atomic weapons in this 'limited' war. On July 9—a mere two weeks into the war...—MacArthur sent [General] Ridgeway a 'hot message' that prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff 'to consider whether or not A-bombs should be made available to MacArthur.' General Bolté, Chief of Operations, was asked to talk to MacArthur about using atomic bombs 'in direct support [of] ground combat'; some ten to twenty bombs could be spared without 'unduly' jeopardizing the general war plan.... At this point in the war, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected the use of the bomb." Halliday and Cumings, op. cit., pp. 49-50. After U.S. troops crossed the 38th parallel, despite China's warning that it would enter the war if that occurred, the war heated up considerably and dangerously. Truman changed from trying to restrain MacArthur to announcing, at a press conference November 30, that the United States would use all its power, not excluding atomic bombs, to contain the Chinese. Within four days, the Prime Minister of Great Britain (Attlee) arrived in the United States (evidently speaking for other countries in Western Europe as well), seeking to prevent what would have been an irreversible first step toward the nuclear devastation of Europe. See LaFeber, op. cit., pp. 116-17.
9. Halliday and Cumings, op. cit., pp. 203-204. The authors point out that Dean Acheson (Truman's Secretary of State), after stating that the Korean war "destroyed the Truman administration" went on to observe that it also "came along and saved us"—where "us" is clearly not the Truman administration but the larger economic and political scene in which Acheson saw himself as moving. And then they add that the war "was the key factor behind the military build-up of NATO and the vast expansion of military budgets in all the major Western countries. The U.S. army expanded from 1.5 million to 3.5 million during the war, and the military budget rose from about $15 billion in 1950 to some $50 billion a year...[and] led to a world economic boom...." Ibid.
10. Not least in forcing estimated hundreds of thousands of Korean girls and women into prostitution for the military—called "comfort ladies"—of course a very well-known fact in both Korea and Japan—but, as is the custom of governments, blandly and officially denied until the 1990s.
11. LaFeber, op. cit., p. 99.
12. James I. Matray (ed.), *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), under the entry "Thirty-Eighth Parallel," pp.

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452-53. This massive "dictionary" covers all aspects of the Korean war and its relevant prior history.

13. Ibid.
14. "1945" of the "In Our Pages: 100, 75, and 50 Years Ago" subsection, *International Herald Tribune,* 24 November 1995, Editorial section.
15. Cumings, *Origins,* op. cit., p. xxi.
16. A term that became part of GI vocabulary during the war against Japan, widespread in Korea, and institutionalized in Vietnam.
17. In all three cases, nationalization of the resources of the three societies was the central issue: oil in Iran, agricultural land (plus shipping, railroads, and communications) in Guatemala, the Suez Canal for Egypt. The United States was critical for the overthrow of the democratically elected (1951) nationalist Mossadegh in Iran, by supplying the military force and CIA guidance that placed our man the "Shah of Shahs" on the throne in 1953 (thus planting the long-growing seeds of the Khomeini "revolution" of 1979). The United States, Dulles using the Monroe Doctrine (1823!) as the official pretext, airlifted arms and CIA-trained Guatemalan exiles to overthrow the duly elected government of Arbenz in 1954 (which had confiscated 178,000 acres of United Fruit Company land, the real ruler of Guatemala throughout this century); and Britain and France, the owners of the Suez Canal Company, were seeking to overthrow the nationalist Nasser. For these, among other such moves of the Eisenhower-Dulles years, see LaFeber, op. cit., chap. 7 ("A Different Cold War. 1953-1955"), esp. pp. 152 ff. For oil and Iran (among other places) see Robert Engler, *The Politics of Oil: Private Power and Democratic Directions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), especially chap. 8, and Michael Tanzer, *The Political Economy of International Oil and the Underdeveloped Countries* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

What was the Commune?...The child has the right to know the reason of the paternal defeats, the socialist party, the campaign of its flag in all countries. He who tells the people revolutionary legends, who amuses them with sensational stories, is as criminal as the geographer who would draw up false charts for navigators.

—Lissagaray, *History of the Commune of 1871*

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BOOKS

Self-Portrait of a Revolutionary

by Victor Wallis

Mumia Abu-Jamal, *Death Blossoms: Reflections from a Prisoner of Conscience*, Foreword by Cornel West, Preface by Julia Wright (Farmington, Pa.: Plough Publishing House, 1997), $12.00, 190 pp.

Mumia Abu-Jamal is a major popularizer of revolution. Although the conditions for his notoriety were very much imposed upon him, he makes the best possible use of his extremely painful, and potentially tragic, platform.

He has been on death row now for almost fifteen years. This time-lapse may well be unprecedented for a case so strongly and explicitly rooted in ideological struggle.

His nemesis through the whole period has been a "hanging judge" who, in addition to supporting a consistent pattern of intimidation of defense witnesses (among many other irregularities), encouraged overt ideological stereotyping as grounds for obtaining the death-sentence. (If the initial verdict of guilt was political in a veiled sense—as with many other convicts from oppressed communities—the sentencing verdict's politics were blatant, thus justifying Mumia's claim to be a prisoner of conscience.[1])

From the opposite direction, a worldwide movement of protest, culminating in the summer of 1995, forced the setting aside of the one actual death-warrant, less than two weeks before it was to take effect. As of February 1997, the case is before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

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As the victim of a judicial and repressive nightmare (including censorship and reprisals against his efforts at public communication), Mumia Abu-Jamal deserves whatever support we can give him. As a writer and, in his own words, "a professional revolutionary," he amply repays the energies of the thousands who have rallied to his cause.

Mumia's previous book, *Live from Death Row*, was primarily a series of exposés (originally written for radio broadcast) of the conditions and the effects of death row itself. The present book, likewise made up of short takes, is more autobiographical and spiritual in content. We learn something of how Mumia got to be who he is: the setting in which he grew up; his painstaking search for a spiritual community; his sensitivity and responsivenesss to every detail—human and inhuman—of his surroundings.

We get to know someone who, living under excruciating conditions of isolation and impending doom, has kept his head and his heart intact. Solid in his own grounding, he is free of bombast in his approach to others. He is open to whatever he can know of the world—from the drama of a besieged revolution (Cuba) to the spider in his neighbor's cell—but he is uncompromising in the affirmation of his core convictions. As he said of Wall Street, in a message to people demonstrating there in his support (December 1996), "It is fitting that we be heard here at America's highest court of appeals. Let the roar of revolution resound from here to all corners of this empire."

Reading Mumia's books, listening to his radio tapes, seeing his videotaped interviews, one can understand why the state's custodians want to get rid of him at all costs. Here is a man who has been a leader since his adolescent years (when he became one of the youngest independent subjects of FBI scrutiny). A skilled analytic journalist and a forceful speaker, rooted yet ecumenical, he can communicate with everyone—in particular, with every possible sector of the oppositional movement that is now struggling to define itself.

One reason, then, for supporting Mumia is that we actually need him, every bit as much as he needs us. He has the rare capacity to illuminate the underside of capitalist society, from first-hand experience, without descending into bitterness.

But there remains also a more general reason for supporting Mumia, one which he himself is the first to acknowledge. While it

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may be true, as earlier revolutionaries have argued, that all great struggles will ultimately be played out as life-and-death confrontations, it is equally true that the routine and systematic use of the death penalty is a capstone for the more diffuse failures of a social order. Advocacy of capital punishment and opposition to even the barest measures of social improvement have always gone hand in hand. Institutionalized killing perpetuates the culture of meanness which competitive priorities demand.

Mumia expresses all this in the form of anecdotes of discovery. They make for compelling reading.

NOTES

1. Mumia's unadorned first name, much like that of Fidel Castro, has come into general public use among his supporters, without a trace of condescension.

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Yugoslavia Dismembered

by Lukin Robinson

Catherine Samary, *Yugoslavia Dismembered*, translated by Peter Drucker (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995), $16.00, 185pp.

The decisions of the U.S. government to send 20,000 troops and of the Canadian government to send 1,000 to enforce the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia make this book especially topical for North American readers. It also answers many myths and errors concerning the breakup of Yugoslavia. It is informative, enlightening, and eminently worth reading.

The media has generally given the impression that the wars in Yugoslavia, with all the crimes and destruction which have disfigured them, have been due to age-old feuds and hatreds. Samary shows that much more is involved and that many of the causes are of recent origin. Yugoslavia did not disintegrate, it was deliberately and willfully torn apart. This is also the conclusion of Laura Silver and Alan Little, the authors of the book *The Death of Yugoslavia* and of the outstanding BBC documentary of the same name. The conduct of the UN and of the so-called international community was shameful from the beginning almost to the end.

The book is valuable first of all because of its maps and tables. These show that there is no area of the country claiming to form a separate state or nation which is ethnically "pure"; all contain large or small minorities of other nationalities. Moreover, the differ-

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ences, for example between Serbs and Croats living together in areas of Croatia and Serbia, are often exaggerated in order to establish a claim for separation. Once conflicts begin, past enmities are revived and exaggerated, passions are aroused, and acts are committed by one side which lead to retaliation and revenge by the other. In this way the descent into the hell of all-out civil war began, first within and between Serbia and Croatia and then by the two combined against Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the Serbian and Croatian leaders had wanted to stop the process, they could have done so. Instead, they instigated, encouraged, and supported the process at every stage. They committed or condoned every villainy and every crime. They and their followers set the example and must bear the responsibility for the worst of the atrocities. All knowledgeable observers confirm Samary's verdict.

Samary's book also contains a chronology of events going back to the Middle Ages. The latest tragedy began ten years ago in Kosovo, in the south of the country, next to Albania, where 80 percent of the people are of Albanian origin and 10 percent are Serbian. In 1987, the Government in Belgrade, headed by Slobodan Milosevic, a former communist turned ultra Serbian nationalist, began to reorganize and arm the Serbian minority against alleged rape and pillage by the Albanian majority. It was a deliberate effort, based on lies, to provoke disorder, which it did. In 1990, Kosovo's autonomy, granted by Tito under the constitution was annulled and its government replaced by a government imposed from Belgrade. This caused six days of rioting, which the Serbian police and army, using tanks and helicopters, brutally suppressed. This was followed by the usual measures of discrimination—thousands of Albanians were laid off and replaced with Serbs; the Albanian majority were forbidden to speak their own language, their schools were closed, street names were changed, and so on, all with the idea of making Kosovo "Serbian."

In acting against Kosovo, the Serbian government announced its aim of creating a greater Serbia to include as many of the Serbs in the rest of the country as it could incite to armed rebellion. Meanwhile, elections in Croatia and in Slovenia, the most northern and richest of Yugoslavia's constituent republics, had produced nationalist governments intent on independence. Slovenia's independence was achieved more or less peacefully, since almost 90 percent of its people are Slovenian. Not so in Croatia, which has a

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substantial Serbian minority, just as the neighboring province of Voivodina in Serbia has a substantial Croatian minority. The election of the Croatian nationalist government and the measures of discrimination and exclusion it immediately began to take against its Serbian citizens, brought back painful memories of the 1940s when Germany, soon after invading Yugoslavia, proclaimed an "independent" Croatian state. It was under German occupation and with German encouragement that the fascist Ustashe killed thousands of Serbs, as well as Jews and Gypsies, and set an example of "ethnic cleansing." The right–wing Serbian Chetniks retaliated in kind. Only Tito's partisans were able to create a united resistance of all nationalities.

The war between Serbia and Croatia, each side supporting its nationals in the neighboring country, began in March 1990 and ended early the following year. 15,000 people were killed and over 200,000 were made refugees.

Meanwhile, the presidents of Serbia and Croatia (Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman) had met secretly to decide how to carve up their next victim. No sooner had the war between their two countries come to an end than they fell on Bosnia-Herzegovina. The siege of Sarajevo began in April 1992. It lasted three and a half years.

Another unusual and valuable contribution of Samary's book is the balanced assessment she gives of the Tito years. The war showed Tito that only the combined resistance of all Yugoslavia's people, regardless of origin, language, or religion, could prevail against the Germans. This distinguished them from the Croatian fascist Ustashe, who openly collaborated with the Nazis, and the Serbian Chetniks under Mihalovic. The Chetniks were virulently anti–communist and fought against Tito's partisans even more fiercely than they did against the Germans. From this came Tito's policy after the war of opposing great Serbian chauvinism and giving increasing autonomy to each constituent republic and province in which a majority or a large minority of the people were not Serbian.

Parallel to this was the effort to reduce economic inequality between the rich and poor areas of the country. The most striking figures in Samary's tables are the ones showing the differences in average income. In Slovenia, the per capita average is seven times higher than in Kosovo; Croatia's average is twice

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as high as Macedonia's and more than sixty percent above the average in Bosnia-Herzgovina. These are 1990 figures, after all the years of the efforts at redistribution. Canadians know how difficult it is to build a united country in the face of wide differences in income and economic opportunity. When the economy is growing, it is still possible for the rich to get richer while skimming off some of the cream for the benefit of the poor and the poorest; when the economy slows down, as it did in Yugoslavia beginning in the 1970s, redistribution becomes more difficult. More than ten years of slow-down, plus a huge foreign debt followed by the usual austerity measures prescribed by the International Monetary Fund, helped to revive national animosities. Everyone wanted a larger share of the shrinking pie, including jobs, and blamed others for not being able to get it. As in Italy, the well–to–do–north came to resent the poor south and turned its attention to the more prosperous northern Europe, above all Germany.

Whenever the media mention the Tito years, which is not often, they are likely to describe them as a long night of darkness and affliction, unrelieved by any achievement. The country's economic history and problems are likewise ignored. In both respects, Samary is more than a welcome exception; she provides essential reading.

But she is at her best on the national question, a subject which permeates her book and from which there is much to learn. The traditional definition of a nation is "a historically constituted, stable community of people with a common ancestry, language, territory, economic life, and culture." A common ancestry, language, history, and culture which, as it certainly did in Yugoslavia, often includes religion, are the elements constituting ethnic origin. Where they are combined with a common territory and thus also a common economic life, it is possible to create an ethnically homogenous nation state. But what if, as throughout Yugoslavia, people of two or more ethnic origins share a common territory, where families of different ancestry, language, and religion have lived side by side in the same towns and villages for generations and have often intermarried? What if two or even three nations simultaneously lay claim to lands which they lived in or ruled in succession in the past, as had happened in the Balkans and, one might add, in the Middle East. The ethnically defined nation claiming the right to self-determination and the nation state cannot

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then be one and the same. Instead, the state as the instrument for governing a common territory and economic life will consist of two or more ethnically defined nations.

Where a people are ethnically homogenous, nationality in the sense of being a citizen of the state and nationality in the sense of ethnic origin can coincide. On the other hand, where ethnic origins have for a long time been mixed, or where as in Canada immigration has increasingly diluted the original homogeneity both of the French Canadian majority in Quebec and of the English speaking majority in the rest of the country, nationality in its two meanings—citizenship and ethnic origin—are two different things. When a sense of ethnic identity is of long standing and deeply felt by two or more peoples, the nation state must recognize the differences and give to each as much room for autonomy and free cultural expression as possible, while at the same time fostering those elements of common interest and interdependence which will enable all to live together and flourish. That is what Tito and the Yugoslav communists tried to do in building their conception of socialism. Under Tito and for several years after he died, tolerance and respect were the hallmark of the ethnically and culturally diverse population of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where forty–four percent of its 4.4 million people are Muslims, thirty–one percent are Serbs belonging to the Eastern (or Greek) Orthodox Church, seventeen percent are Croats and Catholic, and the balance others. Nowhere did the three groups live separate and apart, everywhere they were mixed together. A pride in the harmony in diversity of its people became the badge and bond of citizenship in Bosnia, which the war had destroyed.

In the war started by the Serb and Croat militias in Bosnia, armed and supported by the Serbian and Croatian governments as well as the Serbian (formerly Yugoslav) army, the Muslims were at a disadvantage; they had no outside government or state on which to call for help. The UN made its contribution to their plight by an arms embargo imposed supposedly in order to avoid increased violence! For this violence the Serbs and Croats are above all responsible. Their attempts to carve out ethnically "pure" areas which could be combined into a common territory led to the horrors of ethnic cleansing, and were an unmitigated evil. Thousands were massacred, and hundreds of thousands were forced to become refugees from the homes where many of them had lived

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for generations. Houses, hospitals, libraries, mosques, and museums were burned or pulverized by well aimed shells, and every vestige of their communities and culture was destroyed in order to eradicate any thought of ever going back.

The troops sent to Bosnia to enforce the Dayton peace agreement are committed for one year. But it would be absurd to suppose that their mission can be fulfilled so soon. It will take years and billions in economic aid to repair even a fraction of the physical devastation of the country, to get people back to work and restore the economy to a minimum of working order. It will take many more years to contain and assuage the hatreds let loose and inflamed by the war, and to have the re–arrangement of the country—partition would be a better word—accepted with anything more than sullen apathy or hidden rage. Much that was valuable in the former Yugoslavia, and in Bosnia especially, can never be restored.

But the governments which sponsored and support the Dayton agreement are not primarily concerned with these problems; the reconstruction of the country, for the benefits of its people is not their purpose. A revealing sentence appeared in a news story about the recent Italian election. It said that the task of the new center-left coalition government would be to carry out the "electoral and economic reforms necessary to transform the country from a classic European welfare state to a modern and thriving capitalist democracy." Not many years ago the welfare state was acclaimed as having brought capitalist democracy to its final stage of perfection.

No more. In today's capitalist democracies, whether of the right or of the left, the welfare state is being torn down, and democracy is readily sacrificed to the interests of capital. This is obviously so throughout the former Yugoslavia, where the war has destroyed all the achievements of the Tito years, and much else besides.

In return for promises of economic aid and the rescheduling of payments on its foreign debt, the former federal government was required to privatize all employee–owned and self–managed enterprises, to freeze government salaries and slash spending. Industrial production fell by twenty–five percent between 1989 and 1991, (and has of course fallen a lot more since then.) Samary shows how

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much the "reforms" imposed from abroad helped the forces intent on breaking up the country.

Bosnia's new constitution sets strict limits on how much money the central bank can issue and lend, and provides that the bank's head must be a foreigner. The commission established to oversee public sector enterprises is run by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the man who functions as effective head of the government, with full executive powers and a battalion of foreign assistants and advisors to help him, is Mr. Carl Bildt, a former Swedish prime minister and the European Union's top representative in Bosnia. The elected Assembly and government are little more than a cover for the country's real rulers. Meanwhile, only a small part of the promised aid—itself only a fraction of the amount needed—has been forthcoming and is up to now less than the share of the accumulated foreign debt allocated to Bosnia. All of the former Yugoslavia's constituent republics are to be integrated into the world economy on terms dictated from abroad. Are these the circumstances which will encourage the seeds of democracy to grow?

The participating governments and the media have represented the Dayton agreement and the troops and international police sent to enforce it as a humanitarian enterprise. Like an iceberg, there is a great deal more to them than is made visible on the surface.

II

Samary's book should be read not only for what it says about Yugoslavia, but also for what it tells us with a little reflection about Canada and Quebec. Our history is not as long nor as cruel as the history of Yugoslavia's peoples. Past grievances and injuries should therefore be easier to remedy or forget, and present differences easier to reconcile. But this will only be possible if there is understanding and a willingness to see the other side's point of view. In Yugoslavia, this was tragically lacking.

The panic which seized the Liberals in Ottawa in the last two weeks before the referendum and the result of the referendum itself showed how badly the government had misread Quebec sentiment. And so another round of constitutional debate has begun. Present and former premiers (Bob Rae now prominent among them), business men, constitutional experts and others will

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gather in conferences, seminars, round tables and so on, with their recommendations duly reported and analyzed by the usual assortment of TV talking heads, plus of course the CBS's *72 Hours to Remake Canada*—as if a country with years of unresolved constitutional problems could be remade in seventy-two hours. (Certainly it is worthwhile to bring together people from across the country to take part in seventy-two hours of education and discussion of Canada's constitutional problems, but is it National news?) None of this, from what we have heard so far, is likely to produce anything new—the federal government's latest proposals fall short even of Meech Lake—and another failure, following Meech Lake and Charlottetown, is almost upon us. And all because of a refusal to accept the essential fact of Quebec as a part of Canada different from the rest of the country. It always has been.

The denial of the demands of a national minority for recognition and self–expression when they are expressed in moderate form leads inevitably to their being increased. Nationalist extremism is like a disease which grows in stages and is best treated early. Quebec nationalism is an obvious example. From this point of view, Trudeau in particular did enormous harm. The changes which he made to the federal system were exactly the opposite of what Quebecers had understood him to promise before the 1980 referendum, and they were made in a way which humiliated Quebec, Levesque, and his government. He then helped in no small measure to defeat Meech Lake.

Ninety–three percent of Quebec's population outside Montreal speak French, and almost all of them are of French Canadian descent. In Montreal, the figure is down to seventy percent. Nineteen percent (of whom a growing number are immigrants), speak English and eleven percent (also a growing number), speak other languages. The English speaking immigrants whose mother tongue may not have been English and the immigrants who speak another language at home but English rather than French outside the home are known as Allophones. Thus Quebec, and in particular Montreal, is a multiethnic and multicultural society, and would if independent be a multiethnic state. Both federalists and separatists recognize this fact, which is expressed in Quebec's Charter of Rights and in the government's official policy of cultural pluralism.

If nevertheless the English speaking minority no longer feels as comfortable in Quebec as it used to, several reasons may be

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given. It has lost its former dominant position in Quebec's economic life. The assertion by the French speaking majority of a separate identity demanding recognition and equality is still fairly new and unsettling. What the government does or does not do does not always agree with what it says; it is easier to proclaim an ideal than to live up to it, and expressions of hostility and acts of discrimination may occur even though they are against the spirit and may be against the letter of the law. Finally, what has happened in other countries is not at all reassuring.

English speaking Quebecers, Anglophones as well as Allophones, are in the peculiar position of being a minority in Quebec but part of the majority in Canada, whose federal system they want to preserve. Many and perhaps most of them believe that their rights to self expression and the free use of their language will be more secure in a federal Canada than in an independent Quebec. Separatists interpret this as an attack on their quest for independence and an affront to the sincerity of their pledge to respect minority rights. When the separatists seem inclined to deny the minorities in Quebec, including the aboriginal population, recognition of their distinctiveness and the right to cultural autonomy—as for example in the overzealous enforcement of the French language law—they gravely weaken their case. Such one-sidedness is the essence of chauvinism and xenophobia; Canadians want none of it, and neither do most Quebecers. Equality and justice rest on the fundamental principle that each person's rights and freedoms depend on and must be limited by the rights and freedoms of others. Enlightened separatists understand this as well as anyone else. They must vigorously uphold what both the Quebec and the Canadian Charter of Rights affirm. They must not allow the extremists to shout them down.

The refusal of the federal government and the majority of English speaking Canadians to accede to the demands of Quebec, together with the consequent escalation of these demands and the spirit of chauvinism with which they are supported, makes the position of the English speaking minority, immigrants as well as residents of many generations, increasingly difficult. When they leave, as thousands have and more will, Quebec loses some of its diversity and its economy is impaired. A sort of voluntary or semi-voluntary "ethnic cleansing" is occurring, which separatist as well as federalist French Canadians recognize as harmful. Those who

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leave take with them a bitterness towards Quebec which adds to the difficulties of keeping the country together.

The position of the minorities of different national and ethnic origins across Canada outside Quebec, including the French Canadian minority, is altogether different from the position of the French speaking majority in Quebec. The former do not and cannot have a separate territory and economic life of their own; their citizenship is one thing and their nationality in the ethnic and cultural sense is another. On the other hand, the French Canadians of Quebec do live in a definable territory of their own; large elements of their economic life are now under their ownership and control rather than that of the English, and they obviously have a distinct origin and culture. For them, if they so desire, an independent sovereign state in which citizenship and nationality coincide is possible. Hence, the objection sometimes made by national groups in the rest of Canada— why should Quebec be given what we cannot have?—is invalid; it involves comparing apples and oranges. Whether Quebec independence is desirable or wise is another question. But it is a question for Quebecers and not for us in the rest of Canada to decide. Most Canadians outside Quebec seem unable and unwilling to accept this. It goes against everything they have been taught about our history, truths as well as myths.

Canada's early history is one of exploration, conquest, and settlement. The original inhabitants, now at long last beginning to be accepted as First Nations, were first subdued and most of them later confined to reserves. Some of the settlers were English speaking, others spoke French. When Wolfe defeated Montcalm on the plains of Abraham, English speaking Canadians became the conquerors, French speaking Canadians the conquered. And so they remained, in substance if not in form, for the next two hundred years. They shared a common and expanding territory and lived under changing constitutional arrangements in one state. The conquering nation has, with the help of millions of immigrants, acquired most of the expanded territory and with it a growing and now overwhelming majority.

Confederation was the work of two founding but unequal peoples. Quebec federalists believe that equality can be achieved within Confederation, but owing to opposition from the rest of Canada have not yet succeeded in doing so. The separatists consequently think it is impossible. From this point of view, it could be

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said that the federalists are optimists while the separatists are realists. But when the separatists proclaim their belief in an amicable separation followed by a mutually beneficial association, they are even less realistic than their federalist compatriots.

Some people, Preston Manning's Reformers and the president of the Bank of Montreal among others, say that the way to satisfy Quebec is for the federal government to give to each of the provinces all the powers, short of formal independence, which Quebec is demanding. This is nonsense. The idea that all provinces must be treated equally—an idea dear to the heart of the now thankfully departed Clyde Wells—is a thinly disguised way of emasculating the federal government. If all the provinces were given the same powers as the Quebec federalists now want—never mind the separatists—it would leave almost nothing to the federal government and would effectively destroy our federal system. The provinces would become in effect mini states, more open and favorably disposed than ever to American absorption in all but name, vying with each other more than they do now in giving favors to business in order to attract investment, and consequently zealously cutting spending according to well known business prescriptions.

No doubt this is why this way of "solving the Quebec problem" comes from the right, which is determined to get rid of social programs and just about all of the other gains of the last fifty years, but is opposed by the left and everyone else who retains a spark of a Canadian feeling. Quebec is not a province like the others, and those who insist that it is, no doubt without meaning to be, are grist to the separatist mill, as Preston Manning clearly is and means to be. To meet the demands of Quebec's federalists requires a large measure of asymmetrical federalism—giving more power to Quebec than to other provinces—and an unequivocal statement, preferably in the Constitution, that Quebec is NOT a province like the others but is a distinct society, with a different language and culture, the majority of whose population is of a different national origin. But this idea seems as unpopular as ever in the rest of Canada.

Some people say that Quebec is now in all essential respects the equal of the rest of Canada, that the historic relationship of English Canada as the oppressor and Quebec as the oppressed no longer applies, so why all the fuss? This view echoes the question which used to be asked so often: what does Quebec want? If Quebec has now achieved equality, or even ninety percent equality, it has

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done so only recently, beginning with the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s and largely because there is now a strong French speaking business class.

Until recently, all business of any size, and all the banks and insurance companies, were owned by English speaking Canadians or Americans, and every senior and almost every junior business executive was Anglophone. The language of business was English, the language of the church, education, and the law was French, except when corporate litigation was involved. In the first ninety years of Confederation, not a single word of a single budget speech was spoken in French, and Confederation was more than a hundred years old before there was a French speaking Minister of Finance. Although Quebec society is now very different from what it used to be, there is still a powerful residue from the past in people's thinking on both sides.

How else can we explain the rage which swept through English Canada in reaction to DeGaulle's famous cry "Vive le Quebec libre?" Since Trudeau had from the outset made known his contempt for Quebec nationalism in any form, was not Trudeau–mania among English Canadians an expression, unwitting perhaps, of anti–Quebec feeling, a feeling which later became so evident in the rejection for almost all the wrong reasons of the Meech Lake Agreement? What other source is there for the widespread opposition to recognizing Quebec as a distinct society? And why is there such virulent hostility to the idea of Quebec's right to decide for itself, including the right to decide in a way which we think is mistaken and may deeply regret? Among French speaking Quebecers, there is an equally strong feeling that they are not recognized as equals, and a clear majority are in favor of independence and sovereignty–association, which is not at all the same thing as the severance of all ties, as the separatists have repeatedly emphasized.

The best thing English Canadians who want to temper Quebec nationalism and preserve the country can do is to persuade others to accept Quebec's federalist demands as reasonable or, if not in their view reasonable, as a minimum price of compromise. They should also nail as false Mordechai Richler's and similar hate filled diatribes. Warnings of the economic costs of separation and threats of ostracism or carving up the province are worse than useless. They offend French Canadian pride in the same way as U.S. acts of trade discrimination in violation of the free trade agreement

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offend us. The agreement that, if Canada is divisible, so is Quebec, is exactly the argument the Serbian and Croatian leaders used to dismember Bosnia-Herzegovina when it declared its independence, *after* Serbia and Croatia had already declared theirs.

The trade union movement and the Francophone left in Quebec are solidly separatist, while both the PQ and the Bloc Quebecois which they support have strong social democratic elements. This follows the pattern of national liberation movements everywhere else in the world, which the left has either supported or led. By contrast, the trade union movement and the NDP in the rest of Canada have at best been neutral concerning Quebec. More often, they opposed Quebec's demands, with no understanding of the national question, and in this way helped to push the trade unions and the left in Quebec into the nationalist camp.

But this is now changing. The CLC's attitude to its affiliates in Quebec is now different from what it used to be. Several unions, notably the CAW and CUPE, have members in Quebec and want to retain them. Thus, the position taken by CUPE is exemplary. It held its last biennial convention in Montreal in the week before the referendum. President Judy Darcey said in her opening speech: "We have a strong and enviable record in CUPE of respecting Quebec's right to determine its own future...and the ties that bind us as workers are as strong as ever." The president of the Quebec Federation of Labor (QFL) told the delegates that Quebec's future will not affect the unity of Canadian labor. "From a union standpoint we will never question the solidarity of our sisters and brothers of other trade unions in Canada, in the U.S., or anywhere else in the world." CLC president Bob White said that the relationship between the Congress and the QFL is akin to sovereignty association and "a model of civility—a model for others to emulate." In short, labor solidarity recognizes and at the same time transcends the right of the people of Quebec to decide for themselves. The two aspects are complementary and each adds strength to the other.

Meanwhile, by its obsession with the deficit, the federal government is surrendering its powers in its own way. It is cutting down transfer payments to the provinces for education, health, and social assistance. It is thereby giving up the one means it has of enforcing national standards and also forcing the provinces to cut back their own spending for these purposes. It is cutting back on

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unemployment insurance benefits, and planning to do the same for pensions and old age security. All of this loosens the ties of interest to the federal government in Quebec as well as everywhere else. It makes it less and less appealing for Quebec to stay in the Confederation and reduces the costs or "penalty" of separation. For the committed budget balancers, reducing the deficit comes first and preserving Canada comes second. But this does not stop them from accusing others of betraying the country. The outlook is not encouraging.

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(Continued from inside back cover)

The question now is what has happened to the opposition? Where are the intellectual currents to counter the new reactionary forces? If the cold war spawned the 1960s radicals, where are their counterparts today?

It's hard to think of another age in which the dominant ideology has been so uniformly dominant. This uniformity certainly owes something to the end of the cold war and the Communist collapse, but its roots go further back. In retrospect, we can even see its beginnings in the 1960s, at a time when many left intellectuals were convinced that the old oppositional forces, and the working class in particular, had more or less permanently fallen victim to consumer capitalism. Today, from right to left, the vast majority of intellectuals have bought into the dogma of neoliberalism and "globalization," the conviction that There Is No Alternative. As for the trendy new brands of intellectual radicalism that go under the name of postmodernism (in which some former 1960s radicals have played a not inconsiderable part), they have found their own ways of making peace with the status quo. Decked out in the trappings of rebellion and transgression, they offer no real challenge to the dominant order.

Conservatives are busy rewriting history. The great twentieth-century struggles of the industrial working class, the rise and fall of fascism, the emergence of the postcolonial world, and the role of the international socialist and communist movements in all of these, are replaced by a "struggle" between "good" (the American Way), and what former *Time* editor Henry Grunwald calls "evil" (eternal and everywhere). Postmodern intellectuals can have nothing to say to all this, because for them history is, like everything else, something we can't really know. And a world we can't know is a world we can't change—which brings us back to the "end of ideology" and the unchangeable world of the cold war academic.

But simply because the reality we contemplate is complex and often discouraging does not mean we have lost the tools to understand it—and to challenge it.

NOTE:

Naomi and Gid'on Raz are looking for other *Monthly Review* readers in their area interested in creating a discussion group. They can be reached at:

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(Continued from inside front cover)

pent-up demand for goods unavailable during the war, its political and corporate leadership encouraged a climate in which arms production would resume at nearly full tilt.

In the excerpt from Doug Dowd's memoir, *Blues for America*, he tells one aspect of this story. He recalls the now-forgotten student militancy of the early post-war years, fed by the aspirations of returning veterans, and the reaction against it, both on- and off-campus—foreshadowing the student movement of the 1960s.

But, as Martin Oppenheimer notes in his essay, it was not only the suppression of nonconformists and their ideas that transformed the post-war American university. Academics and their institutions were aggressively recruited for the cold war—and they willingly enlisted. Oppenheimer recounts how America's foremost sociologist, Talcott Parsons, working with the intelligence community and ruling class institutions like the Carnegie Corporation and the Foreign Policy Association, founded Harvard's Russian Research Center as a primary cold war think tank.

This was not an isolated event. The Defense Department funded studies of strategic importance to them. So, for example, anthropologists studied indigenous Guatemalans because they were perceived as a threat to U.S.-supported repressive regimes. And scientists at MIT created computers that developed deep-diving nuclear submarines and the targeting of their missiles. Even the technology of the internet was devised to provide rapid and secure communications for university-based military researchers. The military-industrial complex has been with us for a long time.

And with this military economy came a new theoretical infrastructure for cold war America. In the 1950s and after, both Marxism and New Deal liberalism came under attack as "ideological." For cold war academics, the "end of ideology" meant an immutable capitalist "status quo," which represented the best of all possible worlds. There was nothing more to be done with that world but tinker at its edges.

All that seems part of the dim past and in any event, much of the academic nonsense of that time was undone by the student insurgencies of the 1960s and 1970s. So why rake it up again now? For one thing, though the cold war is over, its intellectual legacy is still alive in today's neoconservative currents. The enemy may no longer be the "evil empire," but there is apparently a new "enemy within": the moral decline of the United States. The excesses of the McCarthy era may have made these moral warriors more circumspect than their predecessors (or, in some cases, their own younger selves), but they still display the inclinations of the censor and the book-burner.

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

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